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Sub-Saharan African countries have suffered relatively little
from trade protection in Japan, the European Community, and
the United States. This is in part due to the substantive prefer-
ential treatment they receive, especially in the European Com-
munity, and in part a consequence of the product mix of their ex-
ports, heavy in primary goods.
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Erzan and Svedberg address two questions in  nontariff protection in the major industrial
this report:  markets.
- Have exporters in Sub-Saharan Africa  In part this is because they often get a better
(SSA) faced more or less protection in Japan, tLhe  prefcrential treatment, especially in the EC.  In
EC, and the United States than other developing  part it is because their exports are heavy
countries?  primary goods which are generally subjecL  to
less protection.
To what extent has protection in those
markets constrained SSA's export growth?  There is no compelling evidence that
protection in the major industrial markets has
Erzan and Svedberg find that on the whole  constrained export growth in SSA.
SSA suffered relatively little from either tariff or
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(I,  II,  III,  IVA,  IVB  and  IVC)PROTECTION  FACING  EXPORTS  FROM  SUB-SAHARAN  AFRICA  IN  THE  EEC,
JAPAN  AND  THE  US
Refik  Erzan*  and  Peter  Ssedberg**
1.  INTRODUCTION
The real  export  earnings  of a  great  majority  of Sub-Saharan  African
(SSA)  1/ countries  declined  over the 1970-85  period.  Moreover,  the African
countries  lost shares  in most of the world  primary  commodity  markets  on a
substantial  scale. In 1988,  Singapore,  with  a population  of 2.5  million,  had
export  revenues  at par  with all  of the  SSA  countries  together  - the home  of
over four hundred  million  people.  It has been shown  that although  supply
shortcomings  were  the  predominant  cause  of  the  poor  export  performance  of  most
SSA countries,  the  demand-side,  specifically  the  deterioration  in the  barter
terms-of-trade  had  a negative  impact  on export  revenues  (Svedberg  (1988)).
The  objective  of this  paper  is to investigate  yet  another  constraint
on the demand-side,  namely,  the extent to which protection  in the major
industrial  market  economies  facing  SSA  products  might  have  hampered  their
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1/  SSA is broadly  defined  as all countries  in the continent  excluding  the
North African  countries  and South  Africa.  The 47 SSA countries  under
study  are  listed  in  Table  6.-2-
export growth.  The  incidence  of protection  encountered  by SSA is analyzed and
compared  with that faced  by all developing  countries  taken together.
Industrial market economies are represented by the EEC (10), Japan
and  the US, which together absorb more than three-fourths  of total African
exports.  This  share has  remained largely unaltered during  the  past  two
decades, particularly in the 1980s.  Both tariffs and non-tariff barriers
(NTBs)  which were effective in  the 1980s  are analyzed.  However,  since tariffs
in industrial market economies, especially those on primary products - the
bulk of SSA exports - are relatively  low, the critical  area is the incidence
of NTBs, although tariff  escalation is  a potential  problem.
The plan of the paper is as follows.  The export performance  of the
SSA countries  over the 1970-85  period is  briefly  summarized  in Section  II.  In
Section III, a short  description  of the  export structure  of these countries is
provided as additional  background.  In Section  IV,  the general  developments in
tariff and NTB protection  of the industrial  market  economies  and escalation  of
trade barriers are discussed.  In Section V, the average tariffs on African
exports  and  the  incidence of  NTBs  are  compared with  those  faced by  all
developing countries taken together.  Also the main NTBs affecting SSA are
singled out.  In Section VI, the SSA countries  are considered individually.
Tariff  averages,  preference  margins  and  the  incidence  of  NTBs  are
investigated.  Furthermore,  products affected by specific  NTBs are examined.
In  the case  of  the EEC, NTBs on major product groups are scrutinized to
distinguish  the  purely  restrictive ones  from  those  that  actually  allow
preferential treatment ot SSA.  A  final, concluding Section summarizes the
main findings  of the study.-3-
2.  THE  EXPORT PERFORMANCE  OF  SUB-SAHARAN  AFRICA
Over the past two decades,  the purchasing  power  of the combined
export earnings of  the  SSA  countries remained  stagnant (see Svedberg
(1988)).  An overwhelming  majority  of SSA countries,  for which data were
available,  had  their  real  export  earnings  dwindle  or stagnate.  Only  three  oil-
exporting SSA countries --  Congo, Cabon and Nigeria --  ar.d  Niger, owing to
uranium,  had increasing  export  earnings  at par  with the  rest  of the  world;
another  four  countries  (Central  African  Republic,  Malawi,  Mali and Rwanda),
had more modest increases  in real  export  earnings. Compared  to the export
achievements  of  the African countries over the  period 1954-69, their
performance  during  the the years  1970-85  was strikingly  bleak.  During  the
earlier  period,  their real export  earnings  grew by 6 percent  annually;  in
fact,  no single  SSA  country  experienced  declining  real  export  earnings  in that
period.
The  meager  performance  of the  SSA  countries  since  the  early  1970s  has
meant  drastically  declining  shares  in  world  markets. Between  1970  and 1986,
their  share  of total  world  exports  fell  from  2.4  to 1.3  percent. In  non-oil
export the decline was even more drastic.  In all primary  commodities
excluding  oil,  their  world  share  fell  from  7 to below  4 percent  (see  Svedberg
(1988)).
The predominant  causes of the poor export  performance  for most
African  countries  are  found  on the  supply-side.  On the  demand-side,  the  most
notable  event  over the 1970-85  period  is the  deteriorating  barter  terms  of
trade  that  all  the  SSA  countries,  except  the  oil-exporters,  experienced.  The
price  decline  of  primary  products  accounted  for  about  one  third  of the  overall-4-
world  market share  loss of the SSA.  The remaining  two thirds  was due to
failures  to expand  export volumes.  The volume  decline  has so far been
ascribed to problems on  the supply-side.  In the  following,  we  shall
investigate  to what extent  protection  in the  main importing  countries  could
have  been  part  of the  explanation.
3.  COMMODITY  COMPOSITION  AND  DESTINATION  OF  SUB-SAHARAN  AFRICA'S  EXPORTS
The s ructure  and intensity  of protection  that  exporters  encounter
differ  considerably  across  products  and markets. Coimnodity  composition  and
destination  of exports were thus important  determinants  of  the overall
protection  faced  by  SSA.
Since  the  time  when  the  African  countries  were  drawn  into  world  trade
by the colonial  powers,  primary  commodities  have dominated  their exports.
Manufactures  defined  narrowly  (as SITC  5 to 8 less  68)  accounted  for  only 6
percent  of SSA's  total  exports  in both  1970  and  1985  (see  Table  1).  1/  Two
major changes occured in  the composition  of  SSA's exports during this
period. First,  the total  value  of crude  oil  exports  expanded  roughly  twenty
1/ Tables  1  and  2  are  based  on partner  country  import  :_atistics.  This  gives
a more accurate  profile  since  import  data  of the  OECD countries  - which
constitute  the  major  market  - are considerably  more reliable  and up to
date. Yeats  (1989a)  found  that,  especially  in  crude  oil,  cacao  and  coffee
- which  are  under  cartels  - many  SSA  countries  underreport  their  exports
with a large  margin.  Furthermore,  in many cases  the  most recent  data
pertain  to 1983 (see Appendix  Tables  1 and 2).  There are two major
shortcomings,  however,  in  using  partner  country  import  statistics.  One is
that the data are in c.i.f.,  rather  than f.o.b.,  prices  - including
freight  and insurance. Secondly,  due to  non-reporting  centrally  planned
economies  and poorly  reporting  developing  countries,  the  actual  share  of
industrial  market  economies  is  overstated.times  and  its  share  jumped  from  13  to  60  percent.  Second,  there  was  a drastic
decline in the share of the exports  - ores and metals, from 32 to 9
percent. The value  of exports  of foodstuffs  and  agricultural  raw  naaterials
roughly  doubled,  yet  their  share  in  total  exports  dropped  by  half.
The predominance  of primary  products  in SSA's  exports  is a mixed
blessing  from the point of view of protection  in the industrial  market
economies. Mineral  fuels,  ores  and  metals  face  negligible  duties  and often
only nominal  NTBs.  Also most tropical  products  which  do not compete  with
production  in the developed  countries  are relatively  less protected  goods.
However,  since  agriculture  is  the  most  heavily  protected  and  subsidized  sector
in the  industrial  market  economies,  in temperate  zone  products  their  markets
are very difficult  to penetrate  (see  OECD (1987)).  Furthermore,  there is
considerable  escalation  in trade  barriers  in  higher  levels  of processing  for
most goods;  agricultural  and mining  (Yeats  (1988)),  as well as in tropical
products  (Cable  (1988)  and  UNCTAD  (1988)).
Only a very small  number  of SSA  countries  have  managed  to diversify
their  export  base during  the 1970-85  period. The  most notable  example  was
Mauritius  where textiles  and clothing  became  the predominant  exports  (see
Appendix  Table 1).  1/  Some other  countries  added  "non-traditional"  primary
products  to their  exports.  These  included  horticultural  and fishery  products
which  also  comprised  some  processed  items.  2/
1/ Appendix  Tables 1  and  2  which give information  for individual  SSA
countries  are based  on these  countries'  own export  data  - as opposed  to
Tables 1  and  2  in the main text which use partner country import
statistics. This is due to the tact  that,  at an individual  level,  for
some SSA countries,  non-reporting  centrally  planned  economies  and *ome
poorly  reporting  developing  countries  are relatively  important  markets.
In these  cases,  a tabulation  based  on partner  countries  would  yield  an
even  more inaccurate  picture.
2/  Certain  processed  goods  do not fall into  the  conventional  definition  of
manufactures.  Conversely,  items  such  as  precious  and  semi-precious  stones
are captured  as manufactures  (see,  e.g.,  Sierra  Leone  in Appendix  Table
1).-6-
Table 1:  Commodity  Composition  of Sub-Saharan  Africa's  Exportsa, 1970  and 1985
percent
Sector  (SITC)  1970  1985b
Non-manufactures  (O to  4 + 68)  94b  94b
Food  (0 +  1 + 22 +  4)  37  20
Agricultural  raw  (2 less  (22  +  27 +  28))  13  6
materials
Ores and metals  (27 +  28 +  68)  32  9
Fuels  (3)  13  60
Manufactures  (5 to 8 less  68)  6  6
Total  (0 to 9)  100  100
(Million  US$)  (7,887)  (37,294)
Source:  COMTRADE Data Base, UNSO.
Notes:
a.  Based on partner  country import  statistics.
b.  Due to  rounding up, the components  add up to 95 percent.
Table 2:  Destination  of Developing  Countries'  Exportsa,  1970  and 1985
percent
Developed  market  economies  Developing  All other
Exports from  Year  Total  EEC  Japan  US  countries  countries
All developing  1970  80  40  12  18  18  2
countries  1985  77  25  16  27  22  1
Non-OPEC  1970  79  35  12  22  20  1
developing  1985  77  21  15  34  22  1
Sub-Saharan  1970  87  58  8  9  11  2
Africa  1985  85  50  2  21  15  0
Memo item:  1970  80  41  7  14  18  2
World  1985  81  37  8  21  18  1
Source:  COMTRADE  Data Base,  UNSO.
Notes:
a.  Based on  partner country import statistics.  Due to non-reporting centrall
planned  economies  and  poorly  reporting developing  countries,  the  figure
overstate  the actual shares  for  developed  market economies.
b.  Developing  countries  are defined  in accordance  with the UN.-7-
Conc,irning  destination,  Europe  and, in particular,  the EEC, is the
dominant  markat  for  SSA's  exports.  More  than  two  thirds  of  total  exports  from
most SSA countries  went to the EEC in 1985 (see  Appenoix  Tahle 2).  Only
around  one-third  of the SSA countries  had less than  half of their  exports
going  to this  market. Botswana,  the  Seychelles  and Somalia  had  less  than  20
percent  of their  exports  to the EEC,  For these  countries,  and also for
Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Kenya, Mozambique  and Sudan,  other developing
countries  (or the South  African  Union  in the  case  of Botswana)  have become
important  markets,  absorbing  roughly  half  of  their  exports.
The concentration  of SSA's  exports  to Europe,  arid  in particular  to
the EEC, largerly  reflects  the  colonial  heritage. The special  ties  of the
industrial  countries  with their ex  colonies still have a  considerable
influence  on  trade patterns  (see Svedberg (1981)  and  Kleiman, (1977)).
Nevertheless,  during the 1970-1985  period, in addition  to the increasing
importance  of other  developing  countries,  there  was also some reshuffling
between  the EEC and the  US markets  for  SSA's  exports. Angola,  Congo,  Cabon
and  Nigeria  - which  are the  main oil producers  - shifted  the bulk  of their
exports  from  the EEC  to the  US.  For  the  coffee  exporters,  Ethiopia,  Burundi
and  Rwanda,  the  opposite  happened  (see  Appendix  Table  2).
The market  concentration  on Europe  had important  implications  for
Africa's  export  growth. Of the  three  main  markets  considered  here,  the  US is
by far the  largest  in  terms  of  non-oil  imports  from  developing  countries. In
fact,  in 1985,  US imports  from  developing  countries  were  roughly  the  same  as
those  of the EEC  and  Japan  taken  together  (see  Table  2).  In the  early  1970s
the situation  was quite  ditferent;  the EEC  was then  the largest  market  for
non-oil  exports  from  developing  countries. Over  a decade,  the  growth  in the
US market  for  developing  country  exports  was  about  twice  the  rate  of that in-8-
the  EEC.  The  share  of  SSA's  exports  going  to  the  US  did  increase
significantly  during this period, from 9  to 21 percent.  However, petroleum
accounted for most of this increase.  A noteworthy  development was that the
share of SSA's exports to Japan dropped drastically, from 8 to 2 percent,
while  this  market  absorbed an  increasing share  of  developing countries'
exports  in general.  It  should be emphasized, however, that while  fuels,
mainly crude  oil, constituted  approximately  half  of SSA's total  exports to th.
EEC, and over three forths of its  exports to the US, they  were negligible in
SSA's exports to Japan.
It seemed that Sub-Saharan  Africa did not have the "right" products
to exploit the potential in the fast growing US market for labor-intensive
manufactures.  Despite an  increase in "new" forms of  protection, the  US
largely remained an open market, and the developing countries on the whole
managed to penetrate  it with great  success  (see  Yeats (1989b)). Nevertheless,
lost opportunity aside, it will be argued in Sections 5 and 6 that the fact
that SSA's exports were concentrated  to the EEC - rather than to the US - did
riot  necessarily imply relatively  less favorable  conditions in terms of trade
barriers faced.  This was due to the preferential  treatment  the SSA enjoyed in
the EEC.
4.  TARIFF AND NON-TARIFF  PROTECTION  IN INDI `RIAL  MARKET ECONOMIES
The  major  accomplishment  of  the  post-war  multilateral  trade
negotiations (MTNs) was the drastic reduction  of industrial  country tariffs.
Through seven rounds  of negotiations  - Ceneva (1947 and 1956),  Annecy (1949),
Torquay (1951),  Dillon (1962),  Kennedy  (1968)  and the  Tokyo (1979)  Round - the
average for the  developed  country  most-favoured-nation  (MFA)  tariffs  was-9-
slashed from 40 to about 5  percent  (see GATT (1980),  UNCTAD (1968)  and
(1982)).  1/
4.1. "New"  Protectionism
As tariffs  have been  progressively  reduced,  the importance  of non-
tariff  barriers  (NTBs)  or non-t^riff  measures  (NTMs),  as they  are sometimes
called,  have increased  significantly  (see  Laird  and  Yeats  (1988)).  2/  While
governments  were under legal obligation  with respect to  tariffs, they
responded  to  domestic  protectionist  pressures  by  resorting  to  NTBs,  which  were
only loosely  monitored  by the  General  Agreement  on Tariffs  and  Trade  (GATT).
Moreover,  the most favored  nation  (MFN)  principle,  the cornerstone  of the
GATT, has been eroded  as NTBs were increasingly  directed  against  specific
countries  and  country  groups.
The spread  of these  measures  and their  domination  of major  sectors,
such  as agriculture,  textiles  and  steel,  is  widely  considered  a threat  to  the
functioning  of  the GATT and, more generally,  the international  trading
system.  The system is challenged  in at least three important  respects.
Firstly, there has been an  increase  in the use of formally  permissible
instruments  of non-tariff  protection.  Agriculture  is  the  case  in  point  where
the  EEC,  for  example,  has  become  one  of the  world's  largest  exporters  of sugar
and beef through  price  support  policies. Secondly,  agreements  such  as the
Multi-Fibre  Arrangement  (MFA),  which are in essence  discriminatory  against
products  of  importance  to developing  countries,  have been "legitimized."
1/ Nevertheless,  there  are tariff  "peaks",  especially  on products  of special
expor;  interest  for developing  countries,  such  as textiles  and clothing
(see  Erzan  and  Karsenty  (1989)).
2/  See, also, Finger  and Laird  (1987),  Nogues  et al (1986)  and Olechowski
(1988).- 10  -
Thirdly, the  use  of "grey area measures",  such as  "orderly marketing
arrangements"  and  "voluntary  export restraints",  has  increased.  These
measures  lack transparency  and involve  de facto  discrimination  among  trading
partners.
Among  the  objectives  of the  current  round  of  MTN,  the  Uruguay  Round,
which  was launched  in 1986,  are the  reversal  of the  trend  concerning  NTBs  and
the full integration  of agriculture  and other  exceptions,  such as textiles
back  into  the  GATT  discipline.  This  mzkes  it the  most  ambitious  MTN  round  so
far.
4.2. Non-Tariff  Barriers
There  is  no commonly  agreed  term  to  describe  non-tariff  instruments,
let  alone  a consensus  on their  coverage. While  NTB is  the  term  preferred  by
economists,  who consider  the  distortions  they  create  the  common  denominator,
policymakers  often  wish  to  classify  them  among  other  policy  measures  and  hence
prefer  the  term  non-tariff  "measures."  The  UNCTAD  Data  Base  on  Trade  Control
Measures,  which  we use in our analysis,  defines  non-tariff  measures  as all
government  regulations  and  practices  that  may  distort  international  trade  by
introducing  differential  treatment  for imported  and domestically  produced
goods.  In doing  so,  no prior  judgment  is  made  as to the  restrictiveness  of
specific  NTBs, or whether  they conform  to national  or international  trade
rules.
The information  thus includes  a wide range  of non-tariff  measures,
some of which might have been implemented  for legitimate  non-protection
reasons, such as  concern for  public health ani  safety.  Since  the- 11  -
discriminatory  effect  of some  measures,  such  as  health  and  safety  regulations,
technical  standards  and excise taxes,  against imports  vis-a-vis  domestic
products  is arguable,  they  have  been  generally  excluded  from  the  analysis  of
official  trade  interventions.  The  "broad"  group  of  NTBs  used  in  such  analysis
includes  para-tariff  measures  (such as  tariff  quotas, seasonal  tariffs,
supplemenntary  tariffs,  etc.),  variable  levies,  countervailing  and  anti-dumping
actions,  quantitative  restrictions,  the surveillance  of quantities  and/or
prices  of imports,  and  various  types  of licensing.  What is  commonly  referred
to as the  "narrow"  group  of NTBs excludes  para-tariff  measures,  "automatic"
licensing  and authorizations  and  import  surveillance  measures.  Finally,
measures  which  with some  certainty  constitute  effective  trade  barriers,  such
as tariff  quotas,  variable  levies,  quantiative  restrictions  and  non-automatic
import  authorizations  and  licenses  are  often  called  "hard  core"  NTBs.
Most  assessments  of  the  general  extent  of  the  application  of NTBs  use
two indicators: trade  coverage  and frequency  ratios  (see Laird  and Yeats
(1989)). The trade  coverage  ratio  measures  the  value  of imports  affected  by
selected  NTBs  as a share  of imports  from  a particular  source. The frequency
ratio  for  a given  importer  is based  on a count  for  all  trading  parties. It
shows  the  number  of tariff  lines  in  which  imports  occur  in  the  presence  of  one
or more NTBs divided  by the total  number  of tariff  lines  where there  are
imports. The  profile  of NTBs  has  been  analyzed  by  computing  these  indicators
for  selected  NTBs  and for  specific  groups  of products. The trends  in trade
intervention  have  been  analyzed  by calculating  these  indicators  for  a number
of years,  using  the trade  flows  of a fixed  base  year as weights. A major
shortcoming  of this  method,  however,  is that  the  underlining  trade  flows  are
already  affected  by NTBs.  In the  extreme  case,  when  an import  barriers  is
prohibitive,  it would appear  that trade  is not affected  at all.  It is- 12  -
therefore important to remember that trade coverage and frequency ratios do
not necessarily  measure the restrictiveness  of the  NTBs considered.
4.3.  Escalation  of Trade Barriers
Most  primary  (unprocessed)  commodities  in  industrial  market
economies, with the exception of some temperate-zone  agricultural products,
are either free of import  duties or face the lowest tariff rates - with the
duties  escalating as  the  goods undergo  increased fabrication.  The  same
pattern holds, although to a lesser extent, for non-tariff protection.  Such
escalation of trade barriers provides  a disincentive  for increased processing
of primary commodities in the developing countries.  This general phenomenon
holds true in the case of tropical products  as well.  Furthermore, following
the Tokyo Round Tariff reductions,  also tariff  escalation in highly processed
tropical  products has increased  (Cable  (1988)).
A recent study by Yeats (1988) considering  sixteen material  groups -
meat, fish, vegetables, fruit,  vegetable  oils, tobacco,  sugar, cocoa, rubber,
leather, wood,  cotton, iron, other metal ores, phosphates and  petroleum -
revealed that in all but fish, average tariffs (incorporating preferential
rates) increased  on the average by five to ten percentage  points  as one  moved
higher in the processing chain.  Furthermore,  in eleven of these cases, the
incidence of NTBs also escalated considerably.  Studies by Cable (1988), and
UNCTAD (1988) corroborated  these findings in tropical products.  Ironically,
developing countries export a much smaller proportion of processed tropical
products than industrial  countries  do.  Escalation  of trade  barriers  certainly
does not help to improve  this imbalance.
It  should  also  be  underlined, however, that escalation of  trade
barriers is not a developed country  phenomenon  only.  The pattern is the same
in the case of developing  countries (Yeats  (1988)),  where, as well, the level- 13  -
of protection  is several  times  higher  than  in  the  industrial  economies  (Erzan
et  al (1989)).
4.4. Preferences
In previous  MTN  rounds,  most  developing  countries  preferred  to stand
by  and  enjoy  the  benefits  of MFN  concessions  which  resulted  from  negotiations
among  the major  industrial  market  economies  rather  than  participate  activjly
on  a  reciprocal  basis. 1/  They also argued strongly for unilateral
preferential  treatment  by the  developed  countries.  Following  discussion  under
the  auspicies  of the  GATT and  UNCTAD  in the late  1960s  and early  1970s,  the
unilateral  preferential  schemes  of industrial  countries  concerning  tariffs
were somewhat  harmonized  and put under  a framework  known  as the  Generalised
System  of  Preferences  (CSP). GSP  covers  only  tariffs,  not  NTBs.
As  the GSP  schemes are unilaterally  granted by  the industrial
countries,  the  list  of beneficiary  developing  countries,  the  product  coverage
and the  depth  of the  preference  margins  vary  considerably  across  the  donors.
In  the  US,  GSP  beneficiaries  are  further  subject  to  a  "competetive  need  limit"
for  each  product  under  the  scheme. An eligible  country  exceeding  this  limit
is temporarily  disqualified  for GSP treatment  of the product  in question.
Otherwise,  imports  under the GSP are duty-free.  More advanced  developing
countries, however, have  "graduated"  from  the  GSP  beneficiary  status
altogether.  In most other  developed  countries,  the preference  margin for
beneficiaries  is a certa-n  percentage  of the MFN rate (see  UNCTAD  (1989)).
Certain limitations  on GSP  treatment  exist in all industrial  countries'
1/ This  was probably  a  major  reason  why  tariff  cuts  in  products  of particular
interest  for  developing  countries  did  not  achieve  the  same  depth.- 14  -
schemes.  The  least developed countries (LLDCs) usually enjoy deeper
preference  margins  and  their  product  coverage  is  somewhat  broader.
A  survey of the GSP schemes  of the major industrial  countries
revealed  that,  on the whole,  the product  coverage  of CSP schemes  in high
tariff  items  was  significantly  narrower  compared  to lower  tariff  items  (Erzan
and  Karsenty (1989)).  The Japanese,  US and EEC CSP  schemes covered,
respectively,  69,  51 and  68 percent  of  all  tariff  positions.  In the  EEC,  CSP
coverage  in high tariff  products  was 69 percent  compared  to 78 percent  in
lower  tariff  items  and  in  the  US  27  and  57  percent,  respectively.
Almost all  Sub-Saharan  countries  are GSP  beneficiaries  in  all
developed  country  markets. Under  this  scheme,  many  of them  also  qualifying  as
LLDCs,  1/ enjoy  wider  product  coverage  and  deeper  preference  margins  compared
to other developing  countries.  In the US, LLDCs are not subject  to the
"competetive  need"  criterion. Furthermore,  all SSA  countries  belong  to the
ACP (Africa,  Caribbean  and  Pacific)  Croup.  2/  In principle,  as  beneficiaries
of the  Lome Convention,  their  exports  enter  the EEC  without  being  subject  to
any  b:rriers  - tariff  or  non-tariff.
1/ Of the  42 LLDCs  according  to the  UN,  25 are in  SSA  (denoted  by  *  in  Table
6).  Mozambique  received  this  status  in 1988. In  addition  to this  list,
both  the  EEC  and  the  US treat  Botswana,  Cape  Verde  and  Tanzania  (also  the
Seychelles  in the EEC)  as LLDCs. However,  Mauritania  in the  EEC scheme
and Ethiopia,  Mauritania,  Mozambique  and  Sao  Tome  in the  US scheme  do  not
have  LLDC  status.
2/  Except  Namibia  and  Reunion.  This  also  goes  for  EEC's  CSP  scheme.- 15  -
5.  TARIFF  AND  NON-TARIFF  PROTECTION  FACING  SUB-SAHARAN  AFRICA'S  EXPORTS  1/
This Section  investigates  the  overall  incidence  of tariffs  and non-
tariff  barriers  on exports  from  SSA in the  major  :ndustrial  -iarket  economies
and compares  this with the  exports  of all developing  countries  in the same
markets.
5.1. Tariff  Protection
The  major  exports  of Sub-Saharan  Africa,  being  primary  products,  are
subject  to  relatively  low  tariff  rates  in  developed  market  economies.  Besides
enjoying  Most  Favoured  Nation  (MFN)  status,  they  are  eligible  for  preferential
treatment  under  the  GSP  schemes  and  the  Lome  Convention.
Table 3  gives trade weighted  average tariffs for all products
excluding  fuels  faced  by  Sub-Saharan  Africa  and  by  all  developing  countries  in
the EEC, Japan and US.  The averages  are based  on the tariffs  which  were
actually  applied  to the individual  countries'  exports,  taking  into  account
preference  margins.  It was  found  that,  in the  EEC,  where  SSA  was virtually
exempt from tariff  duties,  2/ the weighted  average  tariff rate for all
developing  countries  was  1.76  percent  for  all  products.  In  Japan,  the
1/  The  NTB  data  used  in  the  following  Sections  pertain  to 1986  and  (1981  for
comparison). The base year for the data on trade  and tariffs,  on the
other  hand,  is  not  always  the  same. The  apparent  inconsistency  stems  from
the use of various  specially  designed  computer  programmes  which cannot
easily  accommodate  year  to year  changes  in the  product  classifications  of
the  markets  studied.
2/  According  to GATT sources,  in 1986,  58 percent  of  ACP imports  in  the  EEC
had duty-free  treatment  under  MFN and another  41 percent  were admitted
duty-free  under  the Lome  convention. At the  same  time,  nine  percent  of
these  imports  were  eligible  for  CSP  treatment,  implying  full  exemption  or
reduced  tariffs.- 16  -
Table 3:  Trade  Weighted  Average  Tariffsa  Faced by Sub-Saharan  Africa
and All Developing  Countries  in  the EEC, Japan  and the USA
(all products  excluding  fuels)
Exporter  Market
EEC  Japan  USA
p e r c e n t
Sub-Saharan  Africa  0.01  1.64  0.48
All developing  countries  1.76  4.03  6.67
(for same products  Cs
Sub-Saharan  Africa)  (1.75)  (1.71)  (6.63)
Source:  GATT Tariff Study computer  files.
Notes:
a.  The averages are based on actual tariffs faced by individual countries
including  preference  margins in 1983.  Weights  also pertain to  actual 1983
trade.
Tariff lines for which data were not available were excluded.  This was
particularly important in the case of the EEC where over four hundred
items, predominantly in the  food sector, mostly pertaining to variable
levies  with no fixed  component,  had to be excluded.
b.  Average  for  all developing countries, yet  restricted to  the  list  of
products  exported  by Sub-Saharan  countries  to the relevant  markets - using
aggregate trade  weights of all developing  countries.- 17  -
corresponding  figures  were  4.08  percent  for  all  developing  countries  and 1.64
percent for  SSA; in the US  these were 6.67 percent and 0.48 percent
respectively. Hence,  the average  perference  margin,  in percentage  points,
appeared  to  be the  highest  in  the  US,  followed  by Japan.
Part  of these  apparent  preference  margins  were  due  to  differences  in
the  product  mix  of SSA  compared  to  the  rest  of the  developing  countries. To
remove  the  effect  of this  difference,  yet  another  comparison,  limited  to the
same  products  as SSA  countries  exported,  was  conducted.  In weighting  tariffs
for  the constrained  list  of products,  actual  trade  weights  were retained  to
reflect  the  relative  importance  of particular  products  for  each  country. When
the tariff  averages  in the EEC  and the US were calculated  accordingly,  the
results  did  not  change. It can  thus  be concluded  that  the  difference  between
the  average  rates  faced  by SSA  and the  rest  of developing  countries  was the
reflection  of actual  preference  margins.  In Japan,  however,  the average
tariff  facing  all developing  countries,  when restricted  to the  same  list of
products,  was not much different  from that facing  Sub-Saharan  Africa.  The
apparent  margin  in  the  first  calculation  was  thus  mainly  due  to  differences  in
the  composition  of  imports  from  the  SSA  and  other  developing  countries.
It is  noteworthy  that  duty-free  treatment  in the  EEC  under  the  Lome
scheme  provided  only  a negligible  margin  to  SSA's  exports.  On the  other  hand,
the relatively  higher tariff  average in the US facing  other developing
countries  yielded  a substantial  margin  to  Africa.  1/
1/  In the US, a number  of developing  countries  have "graduated"  from  GSP
beneficiary  status.  Furthermore,  exceeding  "competetive  need limits",
some  beneficiaries  temporarily  disqualify  concerning  certain  products.- 18  -
5.2. Non-Tariff  Protection
Using  the two  measures  for the  incidence  of NTBs - their  frequency
and trade  coverage  ratios  (described  in Section  4.2) - Table  4 presents  the
overall  situation  faced by SSA's exports  in comparison  with that for all
developing  countries  taken  together. For  all products  in the three  markets
combined,  the  frequency  of NTBs  on SSA's  exports  was 14  percent  as  opposed  to
24 percent  for  all  the  developing  countries.  On the  other  hand,  NTBs  covered
around  16-18  percent  of the  exports  of  both  groups. When  fuels  were  excluded,
however,  the  trade  coverage  of  NTBs  was  considerably  lower  for  SSA  compared  to
the  aggregate  group  of  developing  countries:  14  percent  versus  24 percent.  1/
The  picture  in the  EEC  market,  which  dominated  the  aggregate  figures,
closely  resembled  the overall  situation  described  above.  In the US, the
frenuency  of NTBs  and their  trade  coverage  of SSA's  exports  did  not  exceed  a
few  percentage  points,  except  in  manufuctures.  In  Japan,  NTB incidence  on  SSA
appeared  to be greater  than  that  encountered  by other  developing  countries.
An inter-sectoral  compar:son  revealed  that,  among  SSA's  exports,  the  products
most affected  by NTBs  were foodstuff  and  manufactures  in all  three  markets,
and  mineral  fuels  in  the  EEC.
In making  these  comparisons,  it should  be observed  that  the  purpose
of using  the  NTB  frequency  and trade  coverage  ratios  is  to  give  a snapshot  by
summarizing  the information  involving  large and diversified  trade flows
encountering  a variety  of  NTBs. However,  for  SSA's  limited  exports,  the  NTB
1/  Computations  by Laird and Yeats (1989)  corroborate  our figures  on the
aggregate  control  group of all developing  countries.  Confining  their
analysis  to  "hard  core"  NTBs  in  1986  facing  non-fuel  exports  of developing
countries in the OECD markets, they arrived  at  18 percent for the
frequency  ratio  and  21 percent  for  trade  coverage.and All  Developing  Countries  in  the  EEC,  Japan  avid  the  U!J
Market
Sectorb  Exporter  EEC  Japan  USA  Total
Frequency  Coverage  Frequency  Coverage  Frequency  Coverage  Frequency  Coverage
ratioC  ratiod  ratio  ratio  ratio  ratio  ratio  ratio
p  e  r  c  e  n  t
Food  SSA  31  15  47  42  5  8  29  15
All  Dev.e  41  26  48  56  9  15  35  28
Agricultural  SSA  8  2  13  1  3  1  8  1
raw  materails  All  Oev.  11  5  17  6  3  12  11  6
Ores and  SSA  5  5  12  4  0  0  5  4
metals  All  Dev.  3  5  6  ;  1  3  3  5
Mineral  SSA  28  31  0  0  0  0  22  18
tuels  All  Dev.  25  27  12  2  0  0  18  11
SSA  6  1  0  0  0  0  5  1 
Chemicals  All  Dev.  3  1  12  19  1  15  3  11
Mianufactures  SSA  12  56  9  8  2  18  11  48
(exi.  chee)  All  Dev.  26  42  8  8  18  24  24  29
All  SSA  15  23  21  17  2  2  14  16
sectors  All Dev.  25  28  15  8  15  14  24  18
Excluding  SSA  15  14  21  17  3  3  14  14
fuels  All  Dev.  25  28  15  21  15  23  24  24
Source: UNCLAD  Data  Base  on Trade  Control  Measures.
Notes:
a.  The  broad  group  of NTBs  used in  the  analysis  incude  para-tariff  measures  such  as tariffs  with  quota,  seasonal  tariffs.  supplementary  tariffs.
etc.,  variable  levies,  countervailing  and anti-dumping  actions,  quantitative  restrictions,  the  surveillance  of quantities  and/or  prices  of
imports,  and various  types  of licensing.  Health  and safety  regulations,  technical  standards  and  excise  taxes  are excluded. While  data  on NTBs
pertain  to 1986,  trade  data  employed  to calculate  frequency  and coverage  ratios  are  of 1984.
b.  Sectors  are  defined  in  SITC  as the following: food  SITC  0 *  I  +  22  + 4, agricultural  raw  materials  SITC  2 less  (22  +  27 *  28),  ores  and  metals
SITC  27 *  28 *  68,  mineral  fuels  SITC  3,  chemicals  SITC  5,  manufactures  SITC  6 to  8 less  68, all  sectors  SITC  0 to 9.
c.  Frequency  Ratio  gives the  number  of trade  flows  covered  by NTBs  as a share  of the total  number  of trade  flows  where  the  number  of trade  flows
is  the number  of national  tariff  lines  times  the  number  of trading  partners  in  which  imports  originate  in  each  tariff  line  in  the  base  year.
d.  Trade Coverage  ratio  measures  the  value  of imports  affected  by selected  NT8s as a  share  of all imports.
e.  All  Dev. stands  for  all  developing  countries.-20-
incidence  indices  are somewhat  irrelevant,  as we can look  into  the products
and  barriers in  a  detailed fashion - a  task which would  have been
insurmountable  in  the  case  of  major  exporters.
We start this detailed  investigation  with the NTBs faced by SSA.
Table  5 lists  the individual  NTBs  and  gives  the  value  of imports  which  were
affected  by the  respective  barrier  in the  EEC,  Japan  and  the  US.  Individual
NTBs  are  not  mutually  exclusive  in  their  zoverage  of imports.  The  information
provided  in Table  5 considerably  modifies  the impression  of the relatively
high NTB  protection  conveyed  by Table  4.  The  predominant  tool  used  by  Japan
against  SSA  happens  to be import  author-zation  (covering  US$133  million  worth
of imports). In the US, the latgest  item  was flexible  import  fees  --  the
counterpart  of the  EEC's  variable  levies  --  used  in  combination  with  bilateral
quotas  (US$82  million)  followed  by  MFA  quotas  (against  imports  from  Mauritius
worth  US$60  million  in 1986).
In the case  of the  EEC,  the  relatively  large  array  of NTBs  and the
volume  of trade  they  cover  give a partially  misleading  impression.  Most  of
these  NTBs relate  to agricultural  products,  especially  foodstuff  which  are
regulated  by the  Conmmon  Agricultural  Policy  (CAP). However,  while  CAP is  an
extremely protectionist  mechanism, for  the  beneficiaries  of  the  Lomr
Convention  it implies  certain  rewards. For instance,  while  other  exporters
are subject  to extremely  high variable  levies,  1/ for the ACP countries  -
including  the  SSA  - these  levies  are  often  reduced  or eliminated.  In turn  SSA
countries  have quota  allocations  under  which  they  can sell  their  produce  at
artificially  high  EEC  domestic  prices  - several  times  the  price  prevailing  in
1/  Variable  levies are used to maintain  an artifically  high guaranteed
domestic  price  in the  face  of fluctuating  international  market  prices.- 21 -
Table 5:  List  of NTBs Facing  Sub-Saharan  Africa's  Exports  in the EEC,  Japan
and the  US and Value  of Trade  Affected
Importsb  (million  US$) from  SSA affected in
NTBa  EEC  Japan  US
Tariff quotas  44.0  9.3
Seasonal tariffs  41.3  - -
Anti-dumping  duties  - - 0.1
Countervailing  duties  - - 0.4
Variable levies  372.4  - -
Variable  component  4.9  - -
Flexible import fees  - - 82.0
Licenses  395.6  0.1  -
Import  authorization  - 133.1
Global quotas, unallocated  - 33.8  -
Global  quotas,  allocated  - - 0.2
Bilateral  (country)  quotas  1.2  - 82.2
MFA quotas  - - 59 9e
Seasonal  quotas  15.2  - -
Quotas not elsewhere spec.  2,984.7c  - -
Surveillance  license  711. 4d  - -
Retrospective  surveillance  1.3  - -
Community surveillance  12.1  - -
Reference  prices  118.8  - -
Price surveillance  1.5  - -
Anti-dumping  investigations  - - 0.2
Countervailing  duty  investigations  - - 0.6
Sole importing  agency  - 12.5  -
(Memo item:  total imports)  (18,266.4)  (1,005.0)  (7,943.5)
(excl.  fuels)  (9,063.3)  (1,005.0)  (1,722.2)
Source:  UNCTAD  Data Base on Trade  Control  Measures.
Notes:
a.  All NTBs in place  during 1986,  except health  and safety  regulations,  prohibition
for conservation,  etc., technical  standards  ane excise taxes.
b.  1984 imports.  The reported import coverages )f the individual NTBs are not
mutually  exclusive  and hence there  can be overlapping  up to a hundred percent.
c.  The bulk of this amount, US$ 2.7 billion, was mineral fuels subject to quota
systems in some EEC  member states.
d.  USS 49 million  of this amount  was mineral  fuels.
e.  1986  MFA import  value.- 22  -
international  marke;s.  These special  provisions  obviously  cannot  be taken
into  account  in Tables  4 and 5, and  consequently,  they  are  not  distinguished
from  the  purely  restrictive  barriers.  To clarify  this  matter,  important  items
are  scrutinized  in  Section  6.3.1.
In the EEC,  national  quota  systems  constitute  the biggest  item in
terms  of import  coverage  (nearly  USS 3 billion). The bulk  of the imports
subject  to  this  tool  is  petroleum  - whose  flow  is  monitored  in  compliance  with
national  energy  conservation  policies,  particularly  by  France.
To conclude  this Section;  the incidence  of NTBs facing  SSA was
somewhat  lower  compared  to that  for  all  developing  countries  taken  together.
However,  there  was  a more  significant  difference  if  one  took  into  account  that
(i)  over  20 percent  of  all  developing  countries'  non-fuel  exports  encountered
"hard  core"  NTBs in the  OECD  markets  (Laird  and  Yeats  (1989)),  (ii)  while  the
nature  of the  NTBs  most  frequently  faced  by SSA  were  relatively  "soft". The
following Section (Section 6)  further narrows down the  focus of  the
investigation by  considering the  SSA  countries and  their  products
individually.
6.  TARIFF  AND  NON-TARIFF  PROTECTION  BY EXPORTER  AND  PRODUCT
This Section addresses  the following  questions:  (i) which SSA
countries  were  most affected  by tariff  and  non-tariff  protection,  (ii)  what
was  the  depth  of  prefet-ence  margins  in  tariffs  for  individual  countries,  (iii)
in which product.s  did exporters  encounter  tariff  "peaks",  (iv)  on which
products  were specific  Nl'Bs  concentrated,  (v) in the EEC, did NTBs allow
preferential  treatment  of SSA, tnd, (vi)  did the incidence  of NTBs on SSA
countries  exports  intensify  during  the  1980s? Table  6 summarizes  the  countryTable  6:  Weighted  Tariff  Averages  and  NTB coverage  on Sub-Saharan  African  Countries'
Exports  In  the  EEC,  Japan  and  the  US
EEC  JAPAN  uS
Weighted  Weighted  Weighted
Iuportsa  avere  tariffsb S  fNTc  lportsa  average  tariffsb.  Weept  Imports  average  tarlffsb.  SOisC
S.  USS  facing  the  (facing  all  coverage  v. USS  facing  the  (facing  all  coverage  *. USS  facing  taO  (facing  all  covereag
exporter  developing)  ratio,  S  exporter  developing)  ratio.  exporter  developing)  ratio, 
Exporter
Angola  6.00.2  0.0  (0.7)  0.1  0.6  0.0  (0.0)  0.0  599.7  0.7  (0.8)  0.0
Bening  109.8  0.0  (0.5)  1.6  1.2  4.1  (0.5)  0.0  0.1  0.7  (4.0)  0.0
Botswana  60.2  0.0  (1.7)  71.2  0.2  0.8  (0.1)  23.8  2.3  1.8  (1.S3)  0.0
Burkina  Faso*  41.9  0.0  (1.3)  13.4  2.6  0.6  (1.3)  0.0  0.9  8.6  (11.1)  0.0
Burundi*  104.5  0.0  (1.9)  0.1  1.8  0.0  10.0)  0.0  10.0  0.2  (1.7)  0.0
Cameroon  1,255.2  0.0  (0.9)  0.6  42.2  1.1  (3.2)  0.1  230.'  0.8  (3.5)  0.1
Cape Verde  2.1  0.0  (2.1)  1.4  ..  ..  ..  ..  1.0  0.0  10.0)  0.0
C.AA.'.  109.0  0.0  (1.6)  0.5  5.6  0.0  to.0)  0.1  3.0  0.4  (5.0)  0.0
Chad*  43.6  0.0  (1.6)  0.0  1.5  0.0  (0.0)  0.0  0.1  29.9  (32.0)  0.0
ComorosO  12.6  0.0  (2.2)  0.4  0.2  0.2  (0.1)  6.1  3.5  0.7  17.5)  0.0
Congo  419.8  0.0  (0.6)  0.7  5.6  0.0  (0.0)  0.0  161.1  0.6  (0.7)  2.7
Djibouti*  3.4  0.0  (1.9)  14.5  0.1  1.9  (5.0)  38.5  0.2  2.2  (6.0)  0.0
Ethiopia*  236.8  0.0  (1.7)  4.0  43.5  0.2  (0.1)  0.6  73.0  0.3  (3.5)  0.0
Eq. Guinea'  36.3  0.0  (1.5)  0.1  ..  . *.  *.  0.7  17.0  (27.7)  0.0
Gabon  750.5  0.0  (0.9)  2.2  15.7  0.0  (0.0)  0.0  195.1  0.7  (3.5)  0.3
Gambia'  14.2  0.0  (1.9)  27.8  8.3  0.5  (4.0)  100.0  0.5  0.0  (1.2)  0.0
Ghana  344.0  0.0  (1.4)  0.3  74.1  0.4  (1.2)  8.7  190.8  0.0  (1.8)  0.1
Guinea*  250.5  0.0  11.6)  0.2  1.1  0.8  (4.3)  17.1  89.1  0.0  (4.0)  0.0
Guinea-B.*  4.3  0.0  01.1)  30.0  0.3  0.5  (4.0)  100.0  0.8  0.7  (4.3)  0.0
Ivory  Coast  2,102.9  0.0  (1.2)  2.1  43.8  0.2  (0.1)  0.1  423.9  0.1  (4,1)  2.2
Kenya  586.8  0.0  (1.7)  11.7  12.3  3.1  (1.7)  10.1  140.6  0.6  (7.1)  0.1
Lesotho'  2.8  0.0  (1.8)  5.2  0.1  0.0  (5.6)  0.0  3.3  13.6  (18.6)  0.3
Liberia  526.1  0.0  (1.2)  0.6  91.7  0.0  (0.0)  0.1  80.8  0.0  (6.1)  0.0
Madagascar  193.9  0.0  (1.4)  6.5  44.3  1.6  (1.9)  72.7  62.4  0.0  (2.4)  7.0
Malawi'  172.9  0.0  (1.7)  6.9  14.1  0.0  (0.0)  99.9  17.3  11.1  (3.7)  0.1
Malil  57.8  0.0  (1.3)  2.0  2.9  4.3  (3.4)  0.0  7.8  1.9  (7.9)  0-7
Mauritania'  206.0  0.0  (1.3)  15.8  135.4  0.7  (4.1)  100.0  2.0  4.3  (ll.5)  1.2
Mauritius  459.9  0.0  (2.1)  47.5  1.3  2.6  (5.1)  46.9  115.7  14.4  (8.7)  61.2
MUzanmb4ue  22.0  0.0  (1.0)  64.2  17.4  2.9  (2.6)  95.9  18.4  0.2  (2.5)  47.5
NdmleDa  ..  ..  ..  ..  *-  . ..  18.4  0.4  (1.4)  0.0Table  6 concl.
EEC  JAPAN  US
Weighted  Weighted  Weighted
Imports'  average  tariffsb.  %  NTBC  .mportsa  average  tariffsb.  %  NTBc  lmportsa  average  tariffsb.  S  NT8C
M.  USS  facing  the  (facing  all  coverage  a. USS  facing  the  (facing  all  coverage  m.  USS  facing  the  (facing  all  coverage
exporter  developing) ratio,  S  exporter  developing)  ratio,  S  exporter  developin5g)  ratio,  S
Exporter  __
Niger'  176.5  0.0  (0.6)  0.3  0.1  0.0  (0.0)  0.0  8.6  0.9  (4.4)  0.2
Nigeria  4,409,J  0.0  (0.8)  0.1  5.1  2.6  (3.1)  85.6  2,519.6  0.7  (2.0)  0.1
Reunion  ..  *.  ..  *.
Rwanda"  146.6  0.0  41.8)  0.?  1.7  0.0  (0.0)  13.5  10.8  0.3  (S.9)  0.0
Sao Tome'  6.3  0.0  (2.3)  0.7  . . *.  ..  '.0  1.9  (3.5)  0.0
Senegal  299.1  0.0  (1.4)  24.6  26.8  3.4  (2.3)  71.4  5.4  2.6  (9.2)  0.1
Seychelles  22.0  0.0  (2.1)  91.1  0.2  3.5  (4.6)  95.9  6.6  3.3  (6.7)  0.0
Sierra  Leone*  138.1  0.0  01.2)  7.3  0.1  3.0  (3.0)  100.0  10.4  0.7  (5.8)  0.0
Somalia'  22.9  0.0  (2.2)  3.6  0.1  0.0  (0.0)  93.5  0.4,  6.1  (8.7)  0.0
Sudan'  118.2  0.0  (1.2)  13.3  43.5  0.0  (0.1)  4.3  12.2  1.1  (18.5)  0.2
Swaziland  119.9  0.0  t2.4)  77.8  9.0  0.0  (0.0)  0.0  18,6  2.2  (7.9)  56.4  ^
tanzania  260.7  0.0  (1.6)  7.0  22.2  0.2  (1.3)  12.1  11,9  0.4  (1.0)  0.0  4-
Togo'  158.2  0.0  (1.3)  2.9  5.2  0.0  (0.0)  0.2  24.1  0.0  (3.8)  0.0
Uganda'  295.0  0.0  (1.6)  0.1  18.2  0.0  (0.0)  0.0  133.0  0.0  (1.6)  0.0
Zaire  1,200.2  0.0  (0.8)  0.2  54.1  0.0  (0.1)  3.3  221.0  0.5  (1.0)  0.0
Zambia  264.9  0.0  (2.1)  0.3  202.8  0.0  (0.1)  0.1  63.1  0.7  (2.0)  0.0
Zimbabwe  453.3  0.0  (2.0)  22.6  61.3  1.2  (0.1)  1.6  69.1  3.2  (8.1)  10.4
Source: GATT  Tariff  Study  computer  files  and  UNCTAD  Data  Base  on Trade  Control  Measures.
Notes:
a.  1986  imports. Apparently  irrelvant  items  such  as  return  goods,  postal  packages,  stamps  etc.  are  excluded  from  the  trade  values  reported.
b.  Trade  weighted  actual  average  tariffs  in 1986,  including  preferences.  The  average  for  the individual  SSA  country  is  based  on Its  own trade
weights  in  the  market  concerned.  The  corresponding  average  for  "all  developing"  is  restricted  to the  same  products  - however  uses  aggregate
trade  weights  of all  developing  countries.
c.  All  NTBs in  place  during  1986,  except  health  and  safety  regulations,  prohibition  for  conservation,  etc.,  technical  standards  and  excise  taxes.
This  broad  definition  of  NTBs includes  para-tarffs,  i.e.  tariffs  with  quota,  seasonal  tariffs,  supplemetary  tariffs,  etc.  In  the  case  of the
EEC,  the  NTBs  are  confined  to those  applied  uniformly  by the  Coemunity,  leaving  out  those  NTis  used  only  by some  member  State(s).
'  Least  developed  countries  (LLDCs)  according  to the  UN.  Mozambique  was  added  to the list  in 1988.- 25  -
specific  information  for  SSA  on trade,  tariffs  and  NTBs  in the  EEC,  Japanese
and the US markets.  Exporter  and product  specific  data on NTBs in the
respective  markets  are  provided  in  Appendix  Tables  4A  o  C.
6.1.  Tariffs  and  Preference  Margins
Weighted average tariffs, including  preferences,  encountered  by
individual  SSA countries  and the  averages  in the  corresponding  products  for
the "control  group"  covering  all developing  countries  were computed  in the
same  fashion  as the  overall  averages  reported  in  Section  5.1. Furthermore,  as
a second  check  of the  underlying  tariff  rates,  the  corresponding  unweighted
tariff  averages  were  also  calculated  (reported  in  Appendix  Table  3).
The results  revealed  that,  in the EEC,  where  SSA enjoyed  virtually
duty-free  treatment,  1/  weighted  preference  margins  were  around  two  percentage
points.  The smallness  of these  margins  were due to (i) the relatively  low
level of EEC's MFN  and GSP tariffs  (given  that most highly protected
foodstuffs  were covered  by variable  levies  with  no fixed  component)  2/,  (ii)
the  fact  that  SSA  had  little  to  export  in  processed  goods  with  higher  tariffs,
and (iii) the preferences  which the :lediterranian  associates  of the EEC
enjoyed.
1/ Unweighted  tariff  averages  in the  EEC  for  14  SSA  countries  were  non-zero,
yet a fraction  of one  percent  (see  Appendix  Table  3).  This  was  due  to a
handful  of items  and seasonal  tariffs  on some  fruits. In  most of these
cases,  SSA  enjoyed  some  preference  margin  over  other  developing  countries.
2/  These  items  which  constitute  roughly  10  percent  of  tariff-lines  in  the  EEC
(see  Erzan  and  Karsenty  (1989))  are  excluded  from  the  tariff  averages.- 26  -
In  Japan  and  the  US,  the  SSA  countries  were  beneficiaries  of the  GSP,
which  implied  duty-free  status  in the  US for  eligible  products.  1/  Weighted
average  tariffs  encountered  by SSA countries  in the Japanese  market  ranged
from zero to four percent.  Weighted  preference  margins were generally
negligible.  In ten cases,  SSA countries  faced slightly  higher weighted
average  tariffs  compared  to the  control  group  of all developing  countries.
This  was  not,  however,  due to less  favorable  treatment  of SSA  as revealed  by
arithmetic  averages  of the  underlying  tariffs  in  Appendix  Table  3.  2/
While  the  weighted  average  tariffs  facing  most SSA  countries  in the
US were zero or under one percent,  for five countries  - Chad, Equatorial
Guinea,  Lesotho,  Malawi and Mauritius  - this rate was between 10 to 30
percent.  Also Malawi  and Mauritius  encountered  considerably  higher  tariff
facing  most  SSA  countries  in  the  US  averages  compared  to the  aggregate  control
group  of all  develoDing  countries.  Behind  all  these  cases  were  the  extremely
high tariffs  on textile  yarn  and  clothing  items  which  were  excluded  from  the
GSP.  3/  The  relative  weight  of  the  few  high  tariff  products  in  SSA's  exports
accounted  for this  outcome. Otherwise,  almost  all  other  SSA  countries  had  a
weighted  average  preference  margin  often  above  4 percent  in  the  US  market.
1/  Except  the  two  OPEC  members,  Gabon  and  Nigeria,  and  Ethiopia,  and  Namibia,
all  SSA  countries  were  beneficiaries  of the  US  GSP  scheme.
2/  Although  the tariff averages  were limited  to the same products  for
comparison,  differences  in the  trade  weights  used (the  country's  export
basket versus overall trade weights of developing  countries  in that
market)  generated  this  result  concerning  weighted  averages.
3/  Even  the  most generous  US scheme  for  developing  countries,  the  Caribbean
Basin Initiative  (CBI), excludes textiles  and  clothing.  The  only
exception  is for  imports  under  the  off-shore  assembly  provision  807, some
of  which  enter  the  US duty-free  (see  World  Bank  (1988)).- 27  -
6.2. Non-Tariff  Protection
While  most  SSA  countries  apparently  encountered  some  NTBs  in  the  EEC,
this  was  not  the  case  in  Japan,  and  especially,  not  in  the  US (see  Table  6).  1/
The  main reason  for  the  difference  in  the  NTB  burden  on the  SSA  countries  in
the  EEC  versus  Japan  and  the  US  was  the  volume  and  diversity  of exports  to  the
former  market. A great  majority  of the  SSA  countries  had  exports  to the  EEC
amounting  to  seve.ral  hundred  million  US$  - covering  a relatively  wide  range  of
products  - as opposed  to  exports  worth  a few  hundred  thousand  or a few  million
USS  to  the  other  two  main  markets.  The  second  major  reason  for  the  difference
in the  apparent  NTB incidence  relates  to the  penetration  of some  SSA  exports
into  otherwise extremely restricted EEC  markets  for  temperate zone
agricultural  products.  While  lack  of trade  gives  a rosy  picture  despite  NTBs,
market  penetration  makes  the  NTBs  visible.
Excluding  the major petroleum  exporters,  which encountered  quota
systems  on fuels  in some  member  States  of the  Community,  2/ nine  countries  -
Botswana,  Gambia,  Guinea  Bissau,  Mauritius,  Mozambique,  Senegal,  Seychelles,
Swaziland  and  Zimbabwe  - had  over  20  percent  of  their  export  products  affected
by NTBs in the  EEC  market. Among  them,  Guinea  Bissau  was the  only  one  with
exports  less than US$ 10 million  to the EEC.  All these  countries,  except
Swaziland  and  Zimbabwe,  also  had  very  high  NTB incidences  in  Japan,  exceeding
90 percent in most cases.  However,  with the exception  of Mozambique  and
1/  NTB  coverage  ratios  reported  in  Table  6 for  individual  SSA  countries  are
not fully  comparable  with the  aggregates  given  in  Tables  4 and 5 due to
the fact that the underlying  import  values  pertain  to different  years
(1986  versus  1984). Another  difference  concerning  the  EEC  is  that  Table  6
pertains  Lo NTBs applied  uniformly  by the Community,  leaving  out those
NTBs  used  only  by some  member  State(s).
2/  Not  accounted  for  in Table  6 which  pertains  to  NTBs  applied  uniformly  by
the  Community.- 28 -
Senegal,  all  had  exports  to  Japan  below  US$10  million. There  were  seven  other
SSA countries in this market which had high NTB coverage.  These were
Djibouti,  Madagascar,  Malawi,  Mauritania,  Nigeria,  Sierra  Leone  and  Somalia.
Three  of them  - Djibouti,  Sierra  Leone  and  Somalia  - exported  less  than  US$
100  thousand  to Japan.
Finally,  in the  US, it  was only  Mauritius,  Mozambique  and Swaziland
which  had NTB coverage  ratios  over  20 percent. Madagascar  and  Zimbabwe  were
the  only  others  facing  NTBs  to  a significant  extent.
6.3.  NTBs By  Exporter  and  Product
Documenting  the  limited  number  of specific  NTBs  affecting  the  export
products  of the  individual  SSA  countries  in  the  Japanese  and  the  US  markets  is
rather  straightforward.  In the  EEC,  however,  the  number  of products  involved
are far greater  and some of the  apparent  NTBs actually  allow  preferential
treatment  of SSA. We should  also  remember  the  differences  in  the  magnitude  of
the  three  markets'  imports  from  SSA  and  the  share  of petroleum  in  this:  (i)
the EEC, total  over US$18  billion,  approximately  half  of it non-fuel,  (ii)
Japan,  around US$1 billion,  no petroleum,  and (iii)  the US, roughly  US$8
billion  yet  less  than  one  forth  of  it  non-fuel.
6.3.1.  The  EEC  Market
In 95 product  categories,  1/ SSA  countries'  exports  to the  EEC  were
affected  by NTBs (see  Appendix  table  4A). When  fuels  - which  were  subject  to
quotas  under  energy  policies  of some  EEC  States  - were  excluded,  imports  from
1/  Defined  at  the  4-digit  aggregation  level  of EEC's  import  clansification  -
which  is  at this  level  identical  with  the  CCCN.- 29  -
SSA subject  to NTBs were  US$1.3  billion,  or roughly  14 percent  of non-fuel
imports.  These products  can be studied  under four large  clusters:  (i)
agricultural  products,  mostly  foodstuff,  subject  to the  CAP,  (ii)  textiles  and
clothing,  exempt from the MFA in the case of SSA, nevertheless  somewhat
affected  by it,  (iii)  precious  and  semi-precious  stones  and  ores  and  minerals,
and (iv)  other  manufactured  goods.
In  addition  to reduced  levels  of barriers  in  most  agricultural  goods,
in five products  - sugar,  beef, rice,  bananas  and rum - imports  from  ACP
countries  are regulated  by special  "regimes"  or "protocols."  Other  than  rice
and rum which had little  relevance  for Africa,  these provided  guaranteed
export revenues  for the SSA countries.  The arrangement  in sugar is an
outright  income  transfer  mechanism,  not  different  from  the  deal the  European
farmers  in the EEC get.  For  the stipulated  annual  ceilings,  SSA countries
receive the artificially  high EEC prices  and pay no duties  or variable
levies. To provide  the  EEC  with  the  agreed  quantities  of sugar  is  not  only  a
right  but as well  a duty  for  the  SSA suppliers. In beef,  the  SSA  countries
enjoy  exemption  from  duties  of  around  20  percent  - and  Botswana  and  Kenya  have
as well  major  reductions  in the  variable  levies  - subject  to annual  ceilings,
which  are often  highly  utilized. Under  the banana  protocol,  the  EEC  pledges
to provide and maintain  the advantages  of the ACP countries  in market
access.  Particularly  in the British,  French and Italian markets, ACP
countries  enjoy  guaranteed  market  shares  provided  by quotas.  However,  ACP
countries,  including  those in SSA, often failed to fully exploit this
advantage.
An inspection  of Appendix  table  4A reveals  that imports  of meat,
including  beef, from  Botswana,  Djibouti,  Ivory  Coast,  Madagascar,  Swaziland
and  Uganda  totaled  US$43  million  (in  1984). The  NTBs  facing  products  falling- 30  -
in this category  were variable  levies,  licenses  and tariff  quotas.  1/  The
information  conveyed here is that when annual ceilings are  surpassed,
exemption  from or reduction  in tariffs  and variable  levies  may no longer
hold.  Sugar imports  from Congo,  Ivory Coast,  Kenya,  Madagascar,  Malawi,
Mauritius,  Swaziland,  Tanzania  and  Zimbabwe  totaled  US$271  million. Licenses
and variable  levies  are listed  as the effective  NTBs for the same reason
explained above.  Bananas from Benin, Cameroon,  Cuinea, Ivory Coast,
Madagascar  and Togo, worth US$86 million came under quotas devised for
promotion  of these  imports.
A large  number  of  SSA  countries  supplied  the  EEC  market  with  fish  and
shellfish  totaling  to US$72  million. Some  of these  products  were  subject  to
reference  prices  and licenses  for  the purpose  of surveillance.  In most of
these goods,  the EEC's  Common  Customs  Tariff  was around  20 percent  and ACP
countries  were  exempt  from  it.  However,  if  the  landed  import  price  was  below
a  certain reference  price, they were subject  to a  compensatory  charge.
Similarly,  imports  of  prepared  or preserved  fish  from  Cape  Verde,  Ivory  Coast
and Senegal,  worth  US$73  million,  were subject  to these  provisions. Fruits
and vegetables  were also important  export  items  for  a large  number  of SSA
countries. Most  of these  were  exempt  from  tariffs,  yet  some  were  subject  to
tariff  quotas  according  to which  tariffs  were restored  above  certain  annual
ceilings. For some,  reference  prices  applied. Especially  in fruits,  there
were  seasonal  tariffs,  often  with  a reduced  rate  for  the  ACP  countries.
In textiles  and  clothing,  despite  f:ee  access  provisions  of the  Lome
Convention,  VERs  (voluntary  export  restraints)  have  been  imposed  on  Mauritius,
1/ The list  of  NTBs  given  in  the  Appendix  Table  relates  to  one  or  more  - not
necessarily  all  - products  in the  product  group. Similarly,  not
necessarily,  all  exporters  listed  are  affected.- 31  -
in France  and the UK.  Furthermore,  ACP countries'  exports  of MFA products
were  put under  import  surveillance.  Imports  into  France  from  the  Ivory  Coast
and  Senegal  faced  some  limitations.
Precious  and semi-precious  stones,  and minerals  and metals  (mostly
copper)  constituting  a very large  category  of imports,  worth  nearly  half a
billion  US$  were subject  to surveillance  licenses  - which,  however,  amounted
to  a  monitoring  measure  rather  than  a restrictive  barrier.
The last  cluster  of goods,  diverse  manufactured  products  - many of
them originating  in duty-free  zones of SSA countries  - were subject to
surveillance  licenses. Some of these  products,  such as radios,  also came
under  quotas  in some  member  States  of the  EEC,  notably  in  France,  Greece  and
Italy.  We have no information  on the  restrictive  effect  of these  measures.
Nevertheless,  the  trade values involved  were extremeley  small and  the
statistics  include  some  irrelevant  items  such  as  used  ships,  etc.
Finally,  we found  no evidence  of a significant  deterioration  in the
preferential  treatment  enjoyed  by SSA in higher  levels  of processing. For
instance,  meat,  fish,  fruits  and vegetables  appeared  to penetrate  the  market
not  with much greater  formality  or difficulty  when they  were in prepared  or
preserved  forms. In  preparations  which  used  inputs  subject  to  variable  levies
- such  as macaroni  made of hard  wheat  - the  "variable  component"  charged  at
the  border  for  the  final  product  was often  reduced  or  eliminated  for  the  SSA
countries.
6.3.2. The  Japanese  Market
Fresh,  chilled  or frozen  fish  (excluding  fillets)  and  other  produce
from  the  sea,  such  as, shrimps,  prawns,  lobsters,  squids  and  octopus,  adding
up to approximately  US$130  million,  constituted  the  bulk  of SSA's  exports  to- 32  -
Japan  which  encountered  NTBs (see  Appendix  Table  4B).  These  products  were  all
subject  to import  authorization  and  some  of them,  worth  around  US$20  million,
were  under  global  quotas  as well.
Import  authorization  in Japan  is a general  measure,  used  mainly  to
monitor imports of  goods considered  "sensitive",  particularly  vis-a-vis
domestic  production.  In cases where informal  VERs ('voluntary'  export
restraints)  exist,  the monitoring  may have important  implications. In the
absence of  other arrangements,  however,  as  is often the  case for SSA
countries,  their restrictive  impact is usually  negligible.  A  number of
exporters,  such  as Djibouti  and  Sierra  Leone,  which  had  extremely  small  export
volumes  covered  by  import  authorization  fall  into  this  category. On the  other
hand,  for  example  in the  case  of Mauritania,  the  largest  supplier  of octopus
in  the Japanese  market, the authorizations  might be more than a  sheer
formality.
Global  quotas  - with no country  allocations  - are potentially  more
potent  barriers. As they  are  administered  on  a first-come-first-serve  basis,
at times,  they  may hinder  even the  small  quantities  which  the SSA  countries
supply. In  addition  to some  sea  products,  global  quotas  affected  a  variety  of
goods,  most importantly  chromium,  niobium  and  tantalum  ores from  Madagascar,
Nigeria,  Rwanda  and  Zaire. Other  major  mineral  exports  of SSA,  manganese  from
Congo,  Gabon  and Ghana  were subject  to tariff  quotas.  1/  Details  of these
barriers  are  not readily  available. However,  it  can be expected  that,  in a
natural  resource  poor country  like  Japan,  with some exceptions,  their  main
purpose  would  not be to curtail  imports. Tariff  quotas  also  covered  leather
1/ This  reflected  the  general  transition  in  the  Japanese  foreign  trade  regime
from  global  quotas  to tariff  quotas  since  the  mid  1980s.- 33  -
from Tanzania  and maize supplied  by Zimbabwe.  Textile fabrics,  fibers,
cordage  and  ropes  from  Burkina  Faso,  Kenya  and  Tanzania  were  subject  to import
authorization  only.  Imports  of tobacco  in Japan  are virtually  under the
monopoly  of the State.  Hence  tobacco  supplied  by Malawi  and  Zimbabwe  fell
under  this  constraint.
6.3.3. The  US  Market
Sugars,  syrups  and molasses  worth  over US$80  million  was the main
item  encountering  NTBs in the  US (see  Appendix  Table  4C).  These  products,
originating  from  Congo,  Madagascar,  Malawi,  Mauritius,  Mozambique,  Swaziland
and  Zimbabwe,  were  subject  to  country  quotas  as  well  as flexible  import  fees  -
the counterpart  of the  variable  levies  of the  EEC.  Due  to the  artificially
high  US domestic  prices,  exports  were  profitable  for  the  SSA  countries  despite
the import  fees.  Consequently,  the country  quotas  were  generally  filled  or
highly  utilized,  implying  that the quantitative  restrictions  were effective
barriers  in  most  cases.
The second  major NTB in the US facing  SSA  was the MFA quotas  on
textile  and clothing  exports  of Mauritius  totaling  US$60  million  (in 1986).
These  quotas  were also  fully  or highly  utilized. However,  while  this  was an
effective  constraint,  some  of the  production  in  Mauritius  might  not  have  been
there  in the first  place  had there  been  no MFA restrictions  on exports  of
major  developing  country  suppliers  of textiles  and  clothing.
Sudan's  cotton  exports  worth  around  two  hundred  thousand  US$  was  also
subject  to bilateral  quotas. Furthermore,  miscellaneous  edible  preparations
with roughly  the same  value  from  Burkina  Faso,  Ivory  Coast,  Kenya,  Mali  and
Swaziland  were  subject  to global  quotas  with  allocations.  Kenya's  exports  of
carnations  and  other  cut  flowers,  totaling  three  hundred  thousand  US$  dollars,- 34  -
were  subject  to  anti-dumping  investigations  and  some  of them  came  under  anti-
dumping  duties. Finally,  less  than  half  a million  dollars  worth  of  wire rods
of iron  and  steel  from  Zimbabwe  triggered  countervailing  duties  in  the  US.
6.4. Change  in the  Incidence  of  NTBs
The incidence  of NTBs  on a country's  exports  might  change  over time
as  a  result of  (i) changes in the destination  of  exports - assuming
differences  .n NTB usage across markets,  (ii) changes in the commodity
composition  of exports,  and (iii)  changes  in the  trade  practices  within  each
market.
As observed  in Section  3, there  were  no significant  changes  in the
commodity  composition  and  destination  of  most  SSA  countries'  exports  over the
period  under  consideration.  However,  the  considerable  intensification  in the
usage  of NTBs by developed  market  economies  in the 1970s  and the 1980s  (see
Laird  and Yeats (1988)  and UNCTAD  (1988))  could  have  affected  SSA as well.
The earliest  NTB data comparable  with the 1986  information  reported  in this
paper  pertains  to 1981.  Using  these,  NTB  coverage  ratios  were computed  for
individual  SSA countries'  in the  EEC,  Japanese  and the  US markets. For the
great  majority  of the  SSA  countries,  however,  there  was  no  or little  change  in
the  share  of their  exports  covered  by  NTBs. The  main  exceptions  were  the  oil
exporting  SSA  countries. Due  to the  abolition  of import  surveillance  on oil
in the US, the shares  of total  exports  from these  six countries  (Angola,
Cameroon,  Congo,  Gabon,  Nigeria  and Zaire)  that  were subject  to NTBs fell
drastically.
The finding  here,  that  SSA  countries  were  not adversely  affected  in
any significant  way by the general  intensification  of NTB protection  during
the  1980s,  is  mainly  due  to  the  commodity  composition  of their  exports. Labor- 35  -
intensive  manufactures  from  developing  countries,  which  triggered  most  of the
NTB action in developed  market economies  - and nevertheless  achieved  a
dramatic  expansion  - constitute  only  a  minute  portion  of SSA's  exports.
The  longer-term  evolution of  the  incidence  of  the  NTBs  SSA
encountered  could  not  be studied  due  to the  fact  that  comparable  information
was not readily  available  on earlier  periods.  However,  it can be safely
stated  that  the  increase  in  the  relative  share  of  agricultural  products  in  SSA
countries'  exports  coupled  with a decline  in non-fuel  mineral  and ores has
made  SSA  more  vulnerable  to protection.
7.  SUMMARY  AND  CONCLUSIONS
Two main questions  were addressed  in this  paper:  (i)  how did the
incidence  of protection  encountered  by SSA's  exports  in the  major  industrial
market  economies  compare  with  that  faced  by  all  developing  countries,  and  (ii)
to  what  extent  protection  in  these  markets  might  have  constrained  SSA's  export
growth?
The findings  on the  first  issue  were  conclusive.  On the  whole,  SSA
had a better  deal in terms  of both tariff  and  non-tariff  protection  in all
three markets.  This was in part due to special  preferential  treatment,
especially  in the  EEC,  and  in  part  a consequence  of the  commodity  composition
of its  exports,  heavy  in  primary  goods.
As  to  the  second question, there was  no  compelling  evidence
suggesting  that protection  in the major industrial  markets has  been a
significant  constraint  on SSA's  export  growth. In fact  we found  evidence  to
the  contrary.  Some  SSA  countries  have  benefitted  from  protection  restricting- 36  -
(MFA) - and  in some cases virtually barring (CAP) - other developing
countries'  exports.
In cases  where  SSA's  exports  were subjact  to "hard  core"  barriers,
they  nevertheless  had  most  often  an advantage  over  other  developing  countries
in  market  access. This  finding  rules  out  protection  in  the  major  markets  as  a
cause  of the  poor  relative  export  performance  of  SSA  countries  with  respect  to
other  developing  countries. We do not,  however,  in  any  definite  manner  rule
out the negative  impact  of protection  on SSA's  exports: most importantly,
because  we lack  information  on the  actual  application  of the  various  license
and  authorization  requirements  which  affect  the  bulk  of SSA's  exports. This,
and a  more thorough  investigation  of the true value of the preferential
treatment  SSA  countries  receive  for  their  major  export  Dr'aucts,  especially  in
the  EEC,  are  among  the  issues  for  further  research.
We have identified  two  other  developments  pertaining  to the  demand-
side  which  might  have  had  some  bearing  on SSA's  poor  export  growth. One  was
the  increase  in the share  of agricultural  products  in SSA  countries'  exports
coupled  with the decline  in non-fuel  minerals  and ores.  This  has made SSA
potentially  more vulnerable  to protection.  The second  development,  was the
slow  growth  in the  EEC,  the  traditional  market  for  Africa. The  growth  in  the
US market for developing  countries'  exports  was over twice that rate in
Europe.
Finally,  we would  like  to remind  the  reader  that,  evaluations  of  the
type  undertaken  in this  paper  necessarily  lave  an ex post  and  myopic  nature,
which  becomes  evident  in  forward  looking  endeavors  such  as the  current  Uruguay
Round of Multilateral  Trade Negotiations  in the auspicies  of the CATT.
Apparently,  SSA  has  very  little  to  gain  from  multilateral  trade  liberalization
in the short term;  in fact  it has  much to lose  on several  accounts.  For- 37  -
instance,  if  there  will  be  a substantial  tariff  reduction  in  tropical  products
(accompanied  by an adjustment  in CSP  rates),  ACP  preferences  in the  EEC  will
be severely eroded.  Similarly,  SSA would suffer  in the short run  if
agricultural  protection  and  subsidies  in  this  market  were  to  be reduced. The
abolition  of  MFA  might  cut  down  some  of the  textile  and  clothing  production  in
SSA.  The simple  fact  remains  to be that,  however,  protection  in the  major
industrial  market  economies  did not  harass  SSA countries  in general,  mainly
because  SSA  did  not have  much  to export  in the  first  place.  The  longer  run
interest  of the  SSA  countries,  like  any  other  country  for  that  matter,  lies  in
a liberal,  non-discriminatory  and stable  trade  environment.  In this  context,
as  the  industrially  more  advanced developing  countries constitute an
increasing  share  of this  environment,  improvements  in  the  conditions  of market
access  in  these  countries  will  also  be  of prominent  importance  for  SSA.- 38  -
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Appendix  Table  1: Export  Structure  of SSA  Countries  by  Main  Product  Cate9cry
percenta
Manu-
Country  Primary  Commodities  factures Others
yearb
Total  Food  Agric.  Fuels  Ores  Total  Total
1970  79  45  8  13  12  21
Angola  1981  88  5  - 82  - 12
1970  89  71  18  - - 11  -
Bonin  1982  53  36  12  4  1  46  1
1970  97  68  28  - 1  3  -
Burkina  Faso  1983  90  34  56  - - 10  -
1970  99  85  10  - 4  1  -
Burundi  1985  91  90  1  - - 5  4
1970  92  63  19  - 10  8
Cameroon  1987  73  40  16  18  9  18  -
1970  94  81  2  - 11  6  -
Cape  Verde  1984  97  84  1  3  9  3  -
1970  56  26  29  - - 44  -
C.A.R.  1980  74  31  43  - - 26  -
1970  95  24  71  - - 2  3
Chad  1975  92  16  67  8  1  8  -
1970  71  18  52  1  - 29  -
Congo  1985  96  1  2  93  - 3  -
1970  98  86  11  1  1  2  -
Ethiopia  1985  99  71  18  10  - I  -
1970  91  2  33  43  14  9  -
Gabon  1983  94  - 7  80  7  6  -
1970  100  100  - - - - -
Gambia  1977  99  99  _  - - - 1
1970  100  78  9  - 13  - -
Ghana  1981  99  51  6  12  30  1  -
1970  98  94  4  - - 2  -
Guinea-Bissau  1980  87  85  2  a  _  8  4- 41  -
Appondix  Table  I  (cont.)
Manu-
Country  Primary  Commodities  factures Others
Yearb
Total  Food  Agric.  Fuels  Ores  Total  Total
1970  94  68  25  1  1  6  -
Ivory  Coast  1985  90  68  12  10  - 9  1
1970  88  63  12  12  1  12  -
Kenya  1983  89  59  6  21  13  11  -
1970  97  4  20  - 74  2  1
Liberia  1984  99  9  26  - 65  - 1
1970  93  79  5  4  5  7  -
Madagascar  1986  91  81  3  2  5  a  -
1970  96  88  8  - - 3  1
Malawi  1983  96  96  - - - 4  -
1970  90  65  24  - I  10  1
Mali  1982  99  40  57  - - 2  1
1970  99  8  3  - 88  1  -
Mauritania  1984  99  50  - - 49  - 1
1970  98  98  - - - 2  -
Mauritius  1983  70  69  - - - 30  -
1970  91  57  23  8  2  9  -
Mozambique  1984  87  69  11  6  1  1  12
1970  96  91  5  - - 3  1
Niger  1981  98  16  1  1  80  2  -
1970  99  31  5  58  4  1  -
Nigeria  1981  99  2  - 97  - - I
1970  95  94  - - 1  5  -
Reunion  1987  89  88  - - 1  10  -
1970  99  61  3  - 35  - 1
Rwanda  1980  100  80  10  - 10  - -
1970  81  65  4  3  9  19  -
Senegal  1981  80  27  2  37  14  20  -- 42  -
Appendix  Tablo  I  (concl.)
Manu-
Country  Primary  Commodities  factures Others
Yearb
Total  Food  Agric.  Fuels  Ores  Total  Total
1971  96  90  1  - 5  4  1
Seychelles  1985  93  11  - 82  - 7  -
1970  40  16  1  3  20  60  1
Sierra  Leone  1983  71  33  1  4  34  29  -
1970  94  86  8  - - 5  1
Somalia  1981  100  98  2  - - - -
1970  100  24  74  1  1  - -
Sudan  1981  99  59  36  4  1  1  -
1970  87  50  30  7  1  13  -
Tanzania  1981  89  63  21  - 5  11  -
1970  94  67  2  - 25  6  -
Togo  1981  85  26  6  1  52  15  -
1970  100  68  22  - 9  - -
Uganda  1976  100  90  7  1  2  - -
1970  93  12  3  - 78  7  -
Zaire  1978  93  29  8  1  55  5  2
1970  100  1  - - 99  - -
Zambia  1982  93  - - - 93  3  4
,976  86  36  9  1  40  13  -
Zimbabwe  1984  80  36  12  1  31  16  4
Source: UNCTAD  Handbook  of lnternational  Trade  and  Development  Statistics,  1988,
Table  4.1.
Notes:
a. Due  to  rounding  up,  the  percentages  do  not  always  add  up  to  a  hundred.
b.  1970  or the  nearest  year  end  the  latest  year  availabie  for  each  country.- 43  -
Appendix  Table  2:  Export  Structure  of  SSA  Countries  by  Main  Destination
percent 8
Industrial  Developing  Socialist
Country  Yearb  Market  Economies  Countries  Countrles
Total  EEC  USC  Japan  Total Africa  Total
1970  92  66  18  7  6  5  -
Angola  1981  68  27  37  1  28  2  2
1970  81  66  5  10  19  18  19
Benin  1981  69  56  1  9  24  20  24
1970  47  31  - 15  51  49  2
Burkina  F.  1983  35  29  1  4  54  26  11
1970  96  32  59  5  4  3  _
Burundi  1986  90  62  5  2  7  6  -
1970  86  73  10  3  10  8  4
Cameroon  1987  78  68  7  1  20  18  2
1975  96  79  - - 4  4  -
Cape  Verde  1984  50  46  - - 50  50  -
1970  92  71  - 4  8  7  -
C.A.R.  1985  96  91  - - 4  4  -
1970  71  71  - - 29  29  -
Chad  1982  65  63  - 2  28  28  -
1970  81  65  2  - 16  13  4
Congo  1985  95  35  60  - 5  3  -
1970  81  20  50  6  17  6  1
Ethiopia  1985  71  49  11  10  20  6  9
1970  72  63  4  1  28  9  1
Gabon  1979  66  40  19  1  31  - 3
1970  99  87  - - I  I  -
Gambia  1980  68  68  - - 30  30Appendix  Table  2 (cont.)
Industrial  Developing  Socialist
Country  Yearb  Market  Economies  Countries  Countries
Total  EEC  USC  Japan  Total Africa  Total
1970  81  47  20  7  8  I  11
Ghana  1983  68  32  6  5  20  16  12
1980  91  56  35  - 9  6  -
Guinea  1983  89  52  37  - 10  5  -
1970  94  94  - - 7  3  -
Guinea  S.  1981  83  62  - - 8  8  10
1970  90  69  19  2  8  8  1
Ivory  C.  1985  72  58  13  1  18  16  6
1970  64  41  12  2  22  12  3
Kenya  1984  56  45  6  1  35  24  1
1970  98  67  23  8  2  1  -
Liberia  1984  92  71  20  1  6  3  2
1970  70  43  23  3  27  20  1
Madagascar  1986  85  58  15  11  9  4  5
1970  77  65  4  - 21  19  -
Malawi  1986  88  58  10  7  12  11  -
1970  29  25  - 4  63  62  2
Mall  1979  76  71  - 3  24  24  -
1970  94  86  1  6  6  6  -
Mauritania  1986  81  54  - 27  15  13  4
1970  98  69  26  - 2  1  -
Mauritius  1986  94  75  18  - 5  4  -
1970  77  54  10  1  20  10  -
Mozambique  1983  51  31  13  7  49  12
1970  65  65  - - 35  35  -
Niger  1982  85  70  - IS  14  14  _
1970  89  71  14  1  8  1  3
Nigeria  1981  90  34  51  2  11  3  -
1970  97  96  1  - 3  1  -
Reunion  1987  93  89  - 3  7  7  -- 45  -
Appondix  Table  2  (concl.)
Industrial  Developing  Socialist
Country  Yearb  Market  Economies  Countries  Countries
Total  EEC  USC Japan  Total Africa  Total
1970  82  29  52  - '8  18  -
Rwanda  1986  95  90  3  1  5  3  -
1970  75  71  - 1  22  22  -
Senegal  1984  50  48  - 2  28  22  -
1975  29  14  14  - 76  14  -
Seychelles  1984  16  5  7  3  85  11  -
1970  95  64  14  17  3  2  3
Sierra  L.  1984  65  56  9  - 6  2  -
1970  30  29  1  - 67  3  3
Somalia  1985  11  10  - - 89  4  -
1970  49  34  4  9  22  6  29
Sudan  1983  34  25  2  5  47  5  18
1970  60  39  11  6  34  10  5
Tanzania  1985  71  58  3  4  24  5  2
1970  91  88  - 3  3  3  6
Togo  1984  66  63  1  1  22  13  12
1970  77  35  24  11  15  4  8
Uganda  1983  89  53  31  5  8  3
1970  76  74  2  - 24  24
Zaire  1982  98  83  3  1  3  2
1970  87  58  - 23  7  1  6
Zambia  1984  68  32  10  24  22  5  10
Source: UNCTAD  Handbook  ot International  Trade  and  'avelopment  Statistics,  1987  and
1988,  Table  3.4.
Notes:
a.  Due  to  rounding  up  and  data  inconsistencies,  the  percentages  do  not  always  add  up
to  a  hundred.
b.  1970  or  the  nearest  year  and  the  latest  year  available  for  each  country.
c.  USA  and  Canada.Appendix  Table  3: Arithmetic  Average  of Actual  Tariffsa  on  SSA  Countries'  Exports  and  t4hat  for  All  Developing  Countries
in  Corresponding  Products  in  the  EEC,  Japan  and  the  US
percent
EEC  JAPiN  US  EEC  JAPAN  US
for  the  for  all  for  the  for  all  for  the  for  all  for  the  for  all  for  the  for  all  for  the  for  all
EXPORTER  exporter developing exporter developing  exporter developing  EXPORTER  exporter developing exporter developing  exporter developing
Angola  0.0  1.4  0.0  0.0  0.3  1.1  Mali  0.0  1.8  1.1  2.5  3.3  5.2
Benin'  0.0  1.5  2.3  2.3  1.6  3.2  Mauritania* 0.0  3.2  4.6  5.0  8.4  9.8
Botswana  0.0  1.9  0.8  0.8  5.7  6.8  Mauritius  0.1  1.9  4.6  4.6  5.9  7.8
Burkina  Faso*  0.2  1.6  0.8  2.4  8.3  9.1  Mozambique' 0.2  1.6  0.8  0.8  1.3  3.7
Burundi'  0.0  1.6  0.0  0.0  3.5  3.7  Namibia  . . ..  2.9  2.5
Cameroon  0.0  1.5  0.4  0.4  4.7  6.0  Niger*  0.0  1.4  0.0  0.0  3.0  4.6
Cape  Verde  0.0  2.1  ..  ..  0.0  0.0  Nigeria  0.0  1.3  1.4  1.5  5.3  4.5
C.A.R.1  0.0  1.9  0.0  0.0  2.4  4.2  Reunion  ..  ..
Chad'  0.0  1.2  0.0  0.0  31.3  31.3  Rwanda*  0.1  1.4  0.0  0.0  4.0  5.2  1
Comoros'  0.0  0.6  0.8  0.8  2.7  6.7  Sao  Tome'  0.0  1.5  ..  ..  6.3  7.5  >
Cong  0.0  1.3  0.0  0.0  0.1  2.4  Senegal  0.1  2.3  2.5  2.6  4.1  5.7  1
Djibouti^  0.0  1.3  2.5  5.0  3.0  4.9  Seychelles  0.0  2.0  2.5  3.3  6.7  8.5
Ethiopia'  0.2  1.4  1.7  1.7  5.4  4.2  Sierra  Leone'  0.0  2.9  3.0  3.0  4.9  5.7
Eq. Guinea'  0.0  1.1  ..  ..  19.8  19.8  Somalia'  0.0  2.2  0.0  0.0  7.4  8.4
Gabon  0.0  1.4  0.0  0.0  4.3  3.6  Sudan'  0.2  1.4  0.4  0.5  7.8  8.4
Gambia  0.0  2.9  3.0  3.8  0.0  1.8  Swaziland  0.2  2.9  0.0  0.0  5.4  7.0
Ghena  0.0  1.9  0.6  0.6  2.3  3.9  Tanzania  0.1  1.3  0.8  0.9  1.2  1.9
Guinea'  0.0  1.7  5.0  6.3  2.1  3.3  Togo'  0.0  1.6  0.0  0.0  2.3  4.1
Guinea-B.*  0.0  2.9  2.5  4.1  0.3  3.8  Uganda*  0.3  1.5  0.0  0.0  5.4  5.8
Ivory  Coast  0.1  2.3  1.1  1.1  4.2  6.4  Zaire  0.0  1.5  0.0  0.2  1.1  2.3
Kenya  0.0  2.2  1.3  1.4  3.8  6.3  Zambia  0.1  1.7  0.0  0.0  0.1  2.0
Lesotho'  0.1  2.1  0.0  5.6  11.6  12.2  Zimbabwe  0.1  1.7  1.1  1.2  7.0  7.8
Liberia  0.0  1.5  1.3  1.3  3.6  4.6
Madagascar  0.0  1.4  0.9  0.9  2.2  2.6
Malawil  0.0  1.4  0.0  0.0  4.5  5.0
Source: GATT  Tariff  Study  computer  files.
Notes:
a.  Actual  tariffs  taking  into  account  preferential  rates.
*Least  developed  countries  (LtOCsl  according  to the  UN.- 47  -
Appendix  Table  A:  SSA's Products  Affected  by NTPs In  the  EEC  by  Product  and Exporter
Va  Iu*
Product"  Exporterb  (million  USS)  NTnd
Meot,  fresh,  chilled  or  frozen  Botswana, Ojibouti,  43.1  Variable  levy,  license,
Ivory  Coast,  Madagascar,  tariff  quota,  surveillance
Swaziland,  Uganda  license
Fish,  fresh,  chilled  or  frozen  Cape Verde,  Gabon, Ghana,  13.0  Reference  prices
Ivory  Coast,  Madagascar,
Mauritania,  Mauritius,
Senegal,  Seychelles
SheJlfish,  fresh,  frozen  Benin,  Cameroon, Eq.  Guinea,  59.5  Reference  prices,
saltod,  etc.  Gabon, Gambla,  Ghana,  surveillance  license
Guinea-Bissau,  Ivory  Coast,
Kenya,  Liberia,  Madagascar,
Mauritania,  Mozambique, Senegal,
Seychelles,  Sierra  Leone,  Somalia,
Tanzania,  Togo
Cut  flowers  Ethiopia,  Ivory  Coast,  15.3  Seasonal  tariffs,
Kenya, Mauritius,  Zimbabwe  community surveillance
Vegetables,  fresh  or  chilled  Burkina-Faso,  Cameroon,  31.3  Quotas n.e.s.,
Ethiopia,  Ivory  Coast,  reference  prices,
Kenya, Mali,  Mauritius,  seasonal  tariffs,
Niger,  Nigeria,  Senegal,  seasonal  quota,
Sudan,  Togo, Zaire  surveillance  license
Vegetables,  provisionally  Kenya, Madagascar,  Swaziland  0.1  License,  quotas,
preserved  surveillance  license
Dried,  dehydrated,  etc.  Swaziland  0.2  surveillance  license
vegetables
Dried  legumlnous vegetables  Kenya, Tanzania,  Zimbabwe  4.2  License,  surveillance
license
Roots  Cameroon, Ivory  Coast,  1.0  Tariff  quota,  variable
Nigeria,  Tanzania  levy,  license,  quota  by
country
Dates,  bananas,  coconuts,  etc.,  Benin,  Cameroon, Guinea,  86.3  Quotas n.e.s.
fresh  or  dried  Ivory  Coast,  Madagascar,  Togo- 48 -
Appendix  Table  4A (cont.):  EEC
Valuec
Producta  Exporterb  (million  USS)  NTBd
Citrus  fruits,  fresh  or dried  Burkina-Faso,  Burundi,  Camercon,  9.2  Seasonal  tariffs,
Ivory  Coast,  Kenya,  Mozambique,  reference  prices
Sierra  Leone,  Swaziland,  Zaire,
Zimbabwe
Grapes,  fresh  or  dried  Ivory  Coast  0.1  Seasonal  tariffs,
reference  prices
Ot?er  nuts,  fresh  or  dried  Malawi  0.1  Reference  prices
Berries,  fresh  Ethiopia,  Ivory  Coast,  Kenya,  1.1  Seasonal  tariffs,
Zimbabwe  reference  prices
Other  fruit,  fresh  Ethiopia,  Ivory  Coast,  Kenya,  3.3  Reference  prices,
Madagascar,  Mauritius,  Senegal,  seasonal  quota
Zimbabwe
Maize  Zambia  0.7  Variable  levy,  license
Rice  Togo  0.1  Variable  levy,  license
Buckwheat,  millet,  Kenya,  Malawi,  Sudan  0.4  Variable  levy,  license
other  cereals
Cereal  groats  and  cereal  meal  Sudan  0.1  Variable  levy,  license
Seeds  Kenya,  Madagascar,  Tanzania,  0.6  License,  surveillance
Zimbabwe  license
Other  prepared,  preserved  meat  Botswana,  Ethiopia,  Kenya,  21.6  Variable  levy,  license
Zimbabwe
Prepared,  preserved  fish  Cape  Verde,  Ivory  Coast,  Senegal  73.0  Quotas  n.e.s,
surveillance  license,
reference  prices
Shellfish,  prepared,  preserved  Gambia,  Ivory  Coast,  Senegal,  0.4  Surveillance  license,
Togo  reference  prices
Beet  and  cane  sugar  Congo,  Ivory  Coast,  Kenya,  271.0  License,  variable  levy
Madagascar,  Malawi,  Mauritius,
Swaziland,  Tanzania,  Zimbabwe- 49  -
Appendix Table  4A (cont.):  EEC
Valuec
Producta  Exporterb  (million  USS)  NT9d
Molasses  Ethiopia,  Ivory  Coast,  Kenya,  35.5  Variable  levy,  license
Madagascar,  Mauritius,  Mozaubiquo,
Senegal,  Somalia,  Sudan,  Tanzania
Sugar  confectionery  Mauritius  0.1  Quotas  n.e.s.,
variable  component
Chocolate  and  other  preparations Ivory  Coast  4,6  Variable  component
containing  cocoa
Macaroni,  spaghetti,  etc.  Ivory  Coast  0.1  Variable  component,
surveillance  license
Tapioca  and  sago  Madagascar  0.3  Variable  component
Vegetables.  prepared,  preserved  Cameroon,  Ethiopia,  Ivory  Coast,  2.0  Quota  by  country,
Kenya,  Madagascar  surveillance  license,
license
Jais,  marmalades,  etc.  Kenya,  Malawi,  Zimbabwe  0.5  Variable  levy,  license
Fruit  otherwise  prepared  Ivory,Coast,  Kenya,  Lesotho,  28.5  Variable  levy,  license,
or preserved  Swaziland,  Uganda,  Zimbabwe  surveillance  license
Fruit  Juices  Ivory  Coast,  Kenya  1,4  Surveillance  license,
variable  levy
Extracts,  etc.  of  coffee,  tea,  Ivory  Coast,  Tozania  0.8  Surveillance  license
mate
Food  preparations,  not  elsewhere  Ivory  Coast,  Nigeria,  Senegal  0.3  Variable  component,
spec.  surveillance  license
Wine  Comoros,  Nigeria  0.1  License,  reference  prices
Spirits  Madagascar  0.1  Quotas  n.e.s.
Residuals  derived  from  cereals  Benin,  Cameroon,  Gabon,  8.0  Variable  levy,  license
or leguminous  vegetables  Ivory  Coast,  Liberia,  Nigeria,  TJgo,
Uganda,  Zaire
Residuals  from  sugar,  starch,  Liberia  0.1  License
etc.  manufacture
Other  vegetable  products  Ghana,  Guinea,  Ivory  Coast  0.9  License- so -
Appendix  Table  4A (cont.):  EEC
Value'
Producta  Exporterb  (million  USS)  NTSd
Metallic  ores  Mozambique,  Zaire  01  Surveillance  license
Petroleum  oils  and  oils  obtained Cameroon,  Congo,  Gabon,  Nigeria  2,74!I.3  Quotas  n.e.s.
from  bituminous  minerals,  crude
Petroleum  oils  and  oils  obtained  Angola,  Cameroon,  Gabon,  Kenya,  62.0  Quotas  n.e.s.,
from  bituminous  minerals,  Nigeria,  Sierra  Leone,  Tanzania  surveillance  license
other  than  crude
Petroleum  gases  Angola,  Nigeria  3.6  Quotas  n.e.s.
Vaccines,  toxins,  etc.  Senegal  0.2  Surveillance  license
Medicaments  Djibouti,  Kenya,  Nigeria  0,1  Surveillance  license
Woven  fabrics  of  man-made  fibers  Togo  0.1  Quotas  n.e.s.
wool  Kenya  0.1  Surveillance  license
Cotton,  not  carded  or combed  Mali,  Sudan,  Tanzania  3.1  Surveillance  license
Cotton  yarn  Cameroon,  Ivory  Coast,  7.3  Surveillance  license
Senegal,  Sudan,  Tanzania,
Zimbabwe
Terry  towelling  of  cotton  Camer.jon  1.4  Surveillance  license
Other  woven  fabrics  of cotton  Bonin,  Cameroon,  Cent.  Afr.  Rep.,  36.7  Quotas  n.e.s.,
Chad,  Eq.  Guinea,  Ivory  Coast,  surveillance  license
Liberia,  Madagascar,  Malawi,  Rwanda,
Senegal,  Zambia,  Zimbabwe
Yarn  of  man-made  fibers  Mauritius  0.1  Surveillance  license
Woven  fabrics  of man-made  fibers  Ivory  Coast,  Mauritius,  Togo,  0.8  Surveillance  license,
Zimbabwe  quotas  n.e.s.
Other  vogetable  textile  fibers  Kenya,  Tanzania  0.3  Surveillance  license
Woven  fabrics  of  jute  Kenya  0.1  Surveillance  license,
quotas  n.e.s.- 51  -
Appendix  Table  4A (cont.):  EEC
ValueC
Producta  Exporterb  (million  USS)  NTB 4
Twine,  cordage,  ropes,  etc.  Kenya, Madagascar,  Tanzania  0.5  Surveillance  license
Gloves,  mittens,  etc.  Mauritius  1.4  Surveillance  license,
quotas  n.e.s.
Under garments,  knitted  or  Djibouti,  Ivory  Coast,  Mauritius,  3.3  Surveillance  license,
crocheted  Senegal,  Tanzania,  Zimbabwe  quotas  n,ee.s.
Outer  garments,  knitted  or  Gambia,  Ivory  Coast,  Lesotho,  24.9  SurvelIlance  license,
crocheted  Malawi,  Mauritius,  Zimbabwe  quotas  n.e.s.
Men's  and  boys'  outcr  garments  Burkina-Faso,  Chad,  Ivory  Coast,  7.4  Surveillance  license,
Kenya,  Lesotho,  Mauritania,  Mauritius,  quotas  n.e,s.
Niger,  Zoebia,  Zimbabwe
Women's, girls'  and infants'  Cameroon, Congo, Ivory  Coast,  2.8  Surveillance  license,
outer  garments  Kenya, Liberia,  Malawi,  Mali,  quotas  n.e.s,
Mauritius,  Sudan,  Zimbabwe
Men's  and  boys  under  garments  Liberia,  Mauritania,  Mauritius,  6.5  Surveillance  license,
Tanzania  quotas  n.e.s.
Wcmen's, girls'  and  infants'  Zimbabwe  0.2  Surveillance  license,
under gariments  quotas  n.e.s.
Bed linen,  table  linen,  Cameroon  0.8  Surveillance  license,
curtains,  etc.  quotas  n.e.s.
Sacks  and  bags  Ethiopia,  Ivory  Coast,  Mauritius  0.6  Surveillance  license,
quotas  n.e.s
Footwear  with  rubber,  etc.  soles  Senegal  0.1  Community surveillance,
surveillance  license
Footwear  with  leather  soles  Burkina-Faso,  Congo, Ethiopia,  Kenya,  0.4  Community surveillance,
Liberia,  Rwanda,  Senegal,  Zimbabwe  surveillance  license
Footwear  with  wood or  cork  soles  Djibouti  0.1  Community surveillance
Footwear  with  soles  of  Mauritius  0.1  Community surveillance
other  materials- 52  -
Appendix  Table  4A (gont.):  EEC
Value;
Producta  Exporterb  (million  USS)  NTid
Parts  of footwear  Burkina-Faso  0.1  Community surveillance
Precious  and  semi-precious  stones  Botswana,  Burundi,  Cent.  Afr.  Rep.,  362.0  Surveillance  license
Congo, Gambia,  Ghana,  Gui  ea,
Ivory  Coast,  Lesotho,  Liberia,
Madagascar,  Mali,  Mauritius,  Nigeria,
Sierra  Leone,  Tanzania,  Togo, Zaire,  Zambia
Ferro-al  loys  Zimbabwe  24.5  Surveillance  license
Iron  or  steel  coils  Zaire  0.1  Comunity  surveillance,
price  surveillance
Bars  and  rods  of  iron  or  steel  Togo  0.1  Retrosp.  surveillance
Angles,  shapes,  etc.  of  Iron  Zimbabwe  1.2  Retrosp.  surveillance,
or  steel  comunity  surveillance,
price  surveillance
Tubes and  pipes  of  iron  and  steel  Congo,  Ivory  Coast  0.3  Surveillance  license
Stranded  wire,  cables,  etc.  of  Congo,  Ivory  Coast,  Uganda  0.1  Surveillance  license
Iron  or  steel
Copper  Benin,  Cameroon,  Congo,  84.2  Surveillance  license
Gabon,  Ivory  Coast,  Kenya,
Senegal,  ZaIre,  Zambia,  Zimbabwe
Nickel  Tanzania,  Zaire,  Zambia,  Zimbabwe  4.2  Surveillance  license
Electrical  goods  Chad,  Liberia  0.1  Surveillance  license
Sound equipment  Gabon  0.1  Surveillance  license
Transmission  and  reception  Cameroon, Congo, Gabon, Guinea,  0.4  Quotas n.e.s
equipment  Ivory  Coast,  Madagascar,  Mali,
Niger,  Senegal
Electrical  apparatus  Benin  0.1  Survelilance  license
Insulated  electric  wire,  cable,  Camaroon  0.1  Surveillance  license
etc.- 53  -
Appendix  Table  4A (concl.):  EEC
Valuec
Producta  Exporterb  (million  USS)  NTBd
Motor  vehicles  Cameroon,  Cent.  Afr.  Rep.,  Congo,  1.5  Surveillance  license
Niger,  Nigeria,  Togo
Parts  and  accessories  of  motor  Angola,  Cameroon,  Congo,  Ojibouti,  0.5  Surveillance  license
vehicles  Gabon,  Ivory  Coast,  Madagascar,  Mali,
Nigeria,  Senegal,  Zimbabwe
Trucks  and  tractors  Ivory  Coast  0.1  Surveillance  license
Flying  machines  Burkina-Faso,  Gabon,  Ivory  Coast,  1.2  Surveillance  license
Mali,  Senegal
Ships  and  boats  Benin,  Ivory  Coast,  Liberia  13.4  Quotas  n.e.s.
Photographic  equipment  Zambia  0.1  Surveillance  license
Medical  instruments  Cameroon,  Congo,  Djibouti,  0.1  Surveillance  license
Gabon,  Ivory  Coast
Watches  i3enin,  Mauritius  0.5  Quotas  n.e.s.
Watch  movements  Mauritlus  2.5  Quotas  n.e.s.
Other  clock  and  watch  par:  Mauritius  0.1  Quotas  n.e.s.
Source: UNCTAD  Data  Base  on  Trade  Control  Measures
Notes:
a.  EEC import  classification  at  the  4-digit  aggregation  level.
b.  Exporters  with  USS 10.000  or  more  in  a  single  product  within  the  aggregate  product  group.
c. Import  values  for  1984  In  the  aggregate  product  group  from  all  SSA  exporters.
d.  NTBs  covering  one  or  more  products/exporters  corcerning  the  aggregate  product  group.- 54 -
Appendix  Table  4B:  SSA's  Products  Affected  by  NTBs  in  Japan  by Product
and  Exporter
Valueb
Producta  Exporter  (million  US$)  NTBC
Live  animals,  n.e.s.  Botswana,  Ethiopia,  0.5  Global  quota
Ghana,  Kenya,  (unallocated),
Liberia,  Senegal,  import
Seychelles,  Zimbabwe,  authorization
Togo,  Tanzania
Aquarium  fish  C.A.R.,  Kenya  0.1  Import
authorization




Other  fresh,  chilled  or  Djibouti,  Ghana,  22.0  Import
frozen  fish  (excluding  Gambia,  Mauritania,  authorization
fillets)  Mauritius,  Namibia,
Senegal,  Seychelles,
Sierra  Leone
Fish,  salted  or  dried,  Reunion,  Senegal,  0.1  Global  quota
n.e.s.  Seychelles  (unallocated),
import
authorization
Shrimps,  prawns  and  Guinea,  Madagascar,  44.5  Import
lobster,  fresh,  chilled  or  Mozambique,  Nigeria,  authorization
frozen  Senegal,  Tanzania
Cuttle  fish  and  squid,  Ghana,  Mauritania,  21.2  Global  quota
fresh,  chilled  or frozen  Nigeria,  Senegal  (unallocated),
import
authorization
Octopus,  fresh,  chilled  Guinea  Bissau,  41.8  Import
or frozen  Mauritania  authorization
Bekko  Kenya,  Seychelles,  0.2  Global  quota
Somalia,  Tdnzania  (unallocated),
import
authorization
Shells  Comoros,  Kenya,  0.1  Import
Tanzania  authorization
Other  live  plants  Ivory  Coast,  Liberia,  0.1  License
Madagascar- S5  -
Appendix  Table  48 (concl.)  Japan
Valueb
Product&  Exporter  (million  US$)  NTBC
Dried  vegetables,  n.e.s.  Zimbabwe  0.1  Global  quota
(unallocated)
Maize  Zimbabwe  0.4  Tariff  quota
Seaweeds  'Madagascar  0.1  Import
authorization
Fish  liver  oil  Ivory  Coast,  Senegal  0.2  Import
authorization
Bacon  Ethiopia  0.1  Import
authorization
Flours  and  meal,  not for  Ethiopia  0.3  Import
human  consumption  authorization
Tobacco  Malawi,  Zimbabwe  12.5  Sole  importing
agency
Manganese  Congo,  Gabon,  8.8  Tariff  quota
Ghana
Chromium,  niobium  and  Madagascar,  Nigeria,  5.5  Global  quota
tantalum  Rwanda,  Zaire  (unallocated)
Leather,  tanned  Tanzania  0.1  Tariff  quota,
global  quota
(unallocated)
Textile  fabrics,  fibers,  Burkina  Faso,  Kenya,  2.0  Import
cordage  and ropes  Tanzania  authorization
Worked  ivory,  etc.  Congo,  Kenya,  0.1  Global  quota
Sudan  (unallocated)
Collections,  zoological,  Kenya  59  Global  quota
botanical,  anatomical,  etc.d  (unallocated)
Source: UNCTAD  Data  Base  on  Trade  Concrol  Measures.
Notes:
a.  According  to Japan's  tariff  classification.  Some related  items  are aggregated
for  the  presentation.
b.  Total import  values  for  1984.
c.  NTBs in 1986.
d.  In  more  recent  years  extremely  low  trade  due to  prohibition.- 56 -
Appendix  Table 4C:  SSA's Products  Affected by NTBs in the  US by Product
and Exporter
Valueb
Producta  Exporter  (million  US$)  NTBC
Sugars, syrups  and molasses  Congo, Madagascar,  82.0  Bilateral
Malawi,  Mauritius,  quotas,
Mozambique,  flexible
Swaziland,  Zimbabwe  import fees
Edible preparations,  n.e.s.  Burkina Faso,  0.2  Global quota
Ivory Coast,  Kenya,  (allocated)
Mali, Swaziland
Fresh cut carnations  Kenya  0.2  Anti-dumping
investigations




Raw cotton (short  and long  Sudan  0.2  Bilateral
staple)  quotas
Textiles  and clothingd  Mauritius  59 . 9e  MFA quotas





Source:  UNCTAD Data Base on Trade  Control  Measures.
Notes:
a.  According  to the US tariff  classification. Some  related items  are aggregated
for the presentation.
b.  Total import  values for 1984.
c.  NTBs in 1986.
d.  All textile  and clothing items  subject  to MFA.
e.  1986  MFA import  value.PPR  Working  Paper  Series
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